Mitigating Agency Problems by Advertising, with Special Reference to Managed Health Care
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.1999.tb00223.x
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Winand Emons, 1997.
"Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 107-119, Spring.
- Winand Emons, 1994. "Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts," Diskussionsschriften dp9402, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
- Gary Biglaiser, 1993. "Middlemen as Experts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(2), pages 212-223, Summer.
- Giovanni Maggi & Andres Rodriguez-Clare, 1995. "Costly Distortion of Information in Agency Problems," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 675-689, Winter.
- Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
- Biglaiser, Gary & Friedman, James W., 1994. "Middlemen as guarantors of quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 509-531, December.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Strausz, Roland, 2005.
"Honest certification and the threat of capture,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 45-62, February.
- Roland Strausz, "undated". "Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture," Papers 018, Departmental Working Papers.
- Strausz, Roland, 2004. "Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 25, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Fares, M’hand & Raza, Saqlain & Thomas, Alban, 2018. "Is there complementarity between labels and brands? Evidence from small French co-operatives," TSE Working Papers 18-895, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Damien S Eldridge, 2007.
"A Shirking Theory of Referrals,"
Working Papers
2007.05, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
- Damien S Eldridge, 2007. "A Shirking Theory of Referrals," Working Papers 2007.05, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
- Damien S.Eldridge, 2013. "A shirking theory of referrals," Working Papers 2013.01, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
- Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015.
"Industrial Organization,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, January.
- Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107069978, January.
- Clerides, Sofronis & Nearchou, Paris & Pashardes, Panos, 2008. "Intermediaries as quality assessors: Tour operators in the travel industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 372-392, January.
- Bartke, Stephan, 2015. "The economic role of valuers in real property markets," UFZ Discussion Papers 13/2015, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).
- Miklós-Thal, Jeanine & Schumacher, Heiner, 2013. "The value of recommendations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 132-147.
- Pashardes, Panos & Clerides, Sofronis & Nearchou, Paris, 2005. "Intermediaries as Bundlers, Traders and Quality Assessors: The Case of UK Tour Operators," CEPR Discussion Papers 5038, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gu, Yiquan, 2008. "Imperfect Certification," Ruhr Economic Papers 78, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
- Andrew Atkeson & Christian Hellwig & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2015.
"Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(1), pages 415-464.
- Guillermo Ordonez & Andrew Atkeson, 2009. "Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns," 2009 Meeting Papers 830, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Atkeson, Andy & Ordoñez, Guillermo & Hellwig, Christian, 2014. "Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns," CEPR Discussion Papers 10080, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andrew Atkeson & Christian Hellwig & Guillermo Ordonez, 2012. "Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns," NBER Working Papers 17898, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andrew Atkeson & Christian Hellwig & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2012. "Optimal regulation in the presence of reputation concerns," Staff Report 464, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Georg Meran & Reimund Schwarze, 2010.
"Can minimum prices assure the quality of professional services?,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 171-199, October.
- Georg Meran & Reimund Schwarze, 2005. "Can Minimum Prices Assure the Quality of Professional Services?," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 531, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Georg Meran & Reimund Schwarze, 2007. "Can minimum prices assure the quality of professional services?," Working Papers 2007-07, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Sofronis Clerides & Paris Nearchou & Panos Pashardes, 2004. "Intermediaries as Quality Assessors in Markets with Asymmetric," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 3-2004, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
- Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson, 1999.
"Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 141-164, Winter.
- Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson, "undated". "Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets," GSIA Working Papers 1999-E31, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson, 1998. "Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 6701, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson, 1998. "Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets," HEW 9809001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- repec:zbw:rwirep:0078 is not listed on IDEAS
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Schilizzi, Steven G.M., 2015.
"Quality signaling through certification in developing countries,"
Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 105-121.
- Emmanuelle AURIOL & Steven G.M. SCHILIZZI, 2017. "Quality Signaling through Certification in Developing Countries," Working Paper b21cacf2-ee84-452f-9e9f-0, Agence française de développement.
- Coestier, Bénédicte, 1995. "Asymétrie d'information, réputation et signes de qualités," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9505, CEPREMAP.
- Choi, Jay Pil, 2003. "Bundling new products with old to signal quality, with application to the sequencing of new products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(8), pages 1179-1200, October.
- Erik Durbin, 2000. "McDonald's or the Michelin Guide? Revealing Quality Through Private-Sector Certification," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1097, Econometric Society.
- Yiquan Gu, 2008. "Imperfect Certification," Ruhr Economic Papers 0078, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
- Minzyuk, Larysa, 2010. "The development of non-monetary means of payment," MPRA Paper 28167, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.
- Michelle Haynes & Steve Thompson, 2012. "The Economic Significance of User-Generated Feedback," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 153-166, February.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:66:y:1999:i:1:p:39-60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1002/(ISSN)2325-8012 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.