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Asymétrie d'information, réputation et signes de qualités

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  • Coestier, Bénédicte

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  • Coestier, Bénédicte, 1995. "Asymétrie d'information, réputation et signes de qualités," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9505, CEPREMAP.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:9505
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    File URL: http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/couv_orange/co9505.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Franklin Allen, 1984. "Reputation and Product Quality," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 311-327, Autumn.
    2. De, Sankar & Nabar, Prafulla, 1991. "Economic implications of imperfect quality certification," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 333-337, December.
    3. Rogerson, William P, 1987. "The Dissipation of Profits by Brand Name Investment and Entry when Price Guarantees Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(4), pages 797-809, August.
    4. Biglaiser, Gary & Friedman, James W., 1994. "Middlemen as guarantors of quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 509-531, December.
    5. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
    6. Barry Nalebuff & David Scharfstein, 1987. "Testing in Models of Asymmetric Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(2), pages 265-277.
    7. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    8. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
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