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Get in line: Do part‐time legislatures use sunset laws to keep executive agencies in check

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  • Brian Baugus
  • Feler Bose
  • Jeffry Jacob

Abstract

Sunset provisions are clauses embedded in legislation that cause a piece of legislation or a regulatory board to expire on a certain date unless the legislature takes affirmative action to renew the legislation or board. Supporters and legislators offer several reasons why sunset laws are valuable and useful. An article by Baugus and Bose (2015), reported on the king‐and‐council model of Congleton (2001), suggests that sunset laws are a key tool legislatures use in asserting themselves against an executive branch that often dominates state government. We investigate this possibility using empirical analysis, which suggests that part‐time legislatures, specifically, a form of part‐time legislature referred to as hybrid legislatures, are more prone to use sunset legislation as a tool to keep the executive preferences in check.

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  • Brian Baugus & Feler Bose & Jeffry Jacob, 2021. "Get in line: Do part‐time legislatures use sunset laws to keep executive agencies in check," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(1), pages 185-199, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:15:y:2021:i:1:p:185-199
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12283
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Elizabeth I. Dorssom, 2021. "Does Legislative Institutionalization Impact Policy Adoption? New Evidence from the Colonial and Early State Legislatures 1757–1795," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1451-1465, July.

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