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Zu neueren Entwicklungen bei der Einbeziehung privater Akteure in Prozesse der öffentlichen Verwaltung: Einige Bemerkungen

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  • Kirchgässner, Gebhard

Abstract

More recently, new modes of collaboration between private and public agents have been developed which provide new possibilities for private interests to influence political processes. These are: (i) intermediate institutions, (ii) direct involvement of private agents in preparing legislative proposals, (iii) invention of new rights to sue for private interests against states which are clandestinely negotiated between bureaucrats and interest groups representatives as parts of international treaties, and (iv) sale to and re-leasing from private investors of public infrastructure. Common to these new modes of collaboration is that the corresponding negotiations are largely secret; even parliaments are often excluded. This can lead to a dramatic reduction of basic democratic rights. The best way to counteract this might be the extension of direct popular rights, in particular the optional and mandatory referendum.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirchgässner, Gebhard, 2014. "Zu neueren Entwicklungen bei der Einbeziehung privater Akteure in Prozesse der öffentlichen Verwaltung: Einige Bemerkungen," Economics Working Paper Series 1413, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, revised Dec 2014.
    • Handle: RePEc:usg:econwp:2014:13
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information; Rent-Seeking; Legislation; Bureaucracy; Public Infrastructure; Direct Popular Rights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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