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Public Choice Theory had Negligible Effect on Australian Microeconomic Policy, 1970s to 2000s

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  • Jonathan Pincus

    (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

Abstract

Since The Calculus of Consent (1962), Public Choice has had little influence on the course of public policy in Australia and, in particular, virtually none on the seismic shift from a policy regime antagonistic to competition, to one that gives conditional approval. Competition, of the attenuated Arrow-Debreu type, led ineluctably to efficiency, if and only if market failures and government failures were corrected. The dismantling of tariff protection illustrates how Computable General Equilibrium modelling reflected the Arrow-Debreu program. Paradoxically, Public Choice antipathy towards interest groups helped create a vast space for public regulation by (presumptively) benevolent and disinterested public servants.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Pincus, 2014. "Public Choice Theory had Negligible Effect on Australian Microeconomic Policy, 1970s to 2000s," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2014-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2014-02
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    References listed on IDEAS

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