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Stock market perceptions of the motives for mergers in cases reviewed by the UK competition authorities: an empirical analysis

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  • Malcolm Arnold

    (Cranfield School of Management, Cranfield University, Cranfield, Bedfordshire, UK)

  • David Parker

    (Centre for Research in Economics and Finance, Cranfield School of Management, Cranfield University, Cranfield, Bedfordshire, UK)

Abstract

A number of studies have considered the motivation of managers to follow a merger strategy. However, as far as we are aware none has looked at the influence of competition regulation on merger motives using stock market data and event study techniques. Data drawn from 63 merger cases in the UK between 1989 and 2003 are examined for the stock market's perceptions of what motivated managers to pursue their initial merger bid. The findings suggest that the Synergy and Hubris dominate as motivations for mergers and that, unintentionally, competition policy may help to reduce the number of mergers motivated by Managerialism. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Malcolm Arnold & David Parker, 2009. "Stock market perceptions of the motives for mergers in cases reviewed by the UK competition authorities: an empirical analysis," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(4), pages 211-233.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:4:p:211-233
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.1445
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shu, Jinhao, 2021. "The M&A Behavior of Family Firms," Junior Management Science (JUMS), Junior Management Science e. V., vol. 6(4), pages 673-699.

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