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Outside board monitoring and the economic outcomes of acquisitions: a test of the substitution hypothesis

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  • Desai, Ashay
  • Kroll, Mark
  • Wright, Peter

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  • Desai, Ashay & Kroll, Mark & Wright, Peter, 2005. "Outside board monitoring and the economic outcomes of acquisitions: a test of the substitution hypothesis," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 58(7), pages 926-934, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:58:y:2005:i:7:p:926-934
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    1. Slusky, Alexander R & Caves, Richard E, 1991. "Synergy, Agency, and the Determinants of Premia Paid in Mergers," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(3), pages 277-296, March.
    2. Jacquemin, Alexis P & Berry, Charles H, 1979. "Entropy Measure of Diversification and Corporate Growth," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 359-369, June.
    3. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
    4. John M. Griffith, 1999. "CEO ownership and firm value," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(1), pages 1-8.
    5. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1988. "The Determinants of Board Composition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(4), pages 589-606, Winter.
    6. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    7. Bradley, Michael & Desai, Anand & Kim, E. Han, 1988. "Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 3-40, May.
    8. Mark Kroll & Peter Wright & Leslie Toombs & Hadley Leavell, 1997. "Form Of Control: A Critical Determinant Of Acquisition Performance And Ceo Rewards," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 85-96, February.
    9. Franks, Julian & Harris, Robert & Titman, Sheridan, 1991. "The postmerger share-price performance of acquiring firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 81-96, March.
    10. Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, 1981. "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 605-617, Autumn.
    11. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    12. Caves, Richard E., 1989. "Mergers, takeovers, and economic efficiency : Foresight vs. hindsight," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 151-174, March.
    13. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    14. Kenneth J. Rediker & Anju Seth, 1995. "Boards of directors and substitution effects of alternative governance mechanisms," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 85-99.
    15. Michael Lubatkin, 1987. "Merger strategies and stockholder value," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 39-53, January.
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    1. Chen, Chung-Jen & Lin, Bou-Wen & Lin, Ya-Hui & Hsiao, Yung-Chang, 2016. "Ownership structure, independent board members and innovation performance: A contingency perspective," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(9), pages 3371-3379.
    2. Crisóstomo, Vicente Lima & Brandão, Isac de Freitas & López-Iturriaga, Félix Javier, 2020. "Large shareholders’ power and the quality of corporate governance: An analysis of Brazilian firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    3. Santiago Kopoboru & Gloria Cuevas-Rodríguez & Leticia Pérez-Calero, 2020. "Boards that Make a Difference in Firm’s Acquisitions: The Role of Interlocks and Former Politicians in Spain," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-19, January.
    4. Acero, Isabel & Alcalde, Nuria, 2021. "Institutional context as a moderator of the relationship between board structure and acquirer returns," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    5. Yuan Chen & Michael Young, 2010. "Cross-border mergers and acquisitions by Chinese listed companies: A principal–principal perspective," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 523-539, September.
    6. Malcolm Arnold & David Parker, 2009. "Stock market perceptions of the motives for mergers in cases reviewed by the UK competition authorities: an empirical analysis," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(4), pages 211-233.
    7. Ferreira, Manuel Portugal & Santos, João Carvalho & de Almeida, Martinho Isnard Ribeiro & Reis, Nuno Rosa, 2014. "Mergers & acquisitions research: A bibliometric study of top strategy and international business journals, 1980–2010," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(12), pages 2550-2558.
    8. Pi-Hui Chung & Cheng-Yu Lee, 2024. "The Attitude of Family Firms Toward Digital Transformation: From the Organizational Learning Perspective," Advances in Management and Applied Economics, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 14(4), pages 1-2.
    9. Díaz Díaz, Belén & Sanfilippo Azofra, Sergio & López Gutiérrez, Carlos, 2013. "Synergies or overpayment in European corporate M&A," MPRA Paper 51070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Etienne Redor, 2016. "Board attributes and shareholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions: a survey of the literature," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 20(4), pages 789-821, December.
    11. Kanungo, Rama Prasad, 2021. "Uncertainty of M&As under asymmetric estimation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 774-793.
    12. Agha, Mahmoud & Hossain, Md Mosharraf, 2022. "Are board monitoring and CEO incentives substitutes for each other? Evidence from Australian market reaction to acquisition announcements," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    13. Jaskiewicz, Peter & Klein, Sabine, 2007. "The impact of goal alignment on board composition and board size in family businesses," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 60(10), pages 1080-1089, October.
    14. Almudena Martinez-Campillo & Roberto Fernandez-Gago, 2008. "The Diversification-Performance relationship in Spanish Firms: Does The CEO/S Behaviour Style matter?," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(1-2), pages 57-70.
    15. Kobeissi, Nada & Sun, Xian & Wang, Haizhi, 2010. "Managerial labor-market discipline and the characteristics of merger and acquisition transactions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(7), pages 721-728, July.
    16. Kuan, Tsung-Han & Li, Chu-Shiu & Chu, Shin-Herng, 2011. "Cash holdings and corporate governance in family-controlled firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(7), pages 757-764, July.

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