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Well‐paid nurses are good nurses

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  • Alessandro Fedele

Abstract

Some recent articles suggest that increasing wage in the nursing market with the aim of reducing shortage can negatively impact on the average ability and motivation of applicants attracted and, in turn, on the average quality of care. This finding is at odds with empirical evidence and has been criticized on the grounds that nurses' motivation is modeled in an overly simplistic way. This paper provides a novel theoretical framework where the orientation of nurses' motivation—intrinsic versus extrinsic—is taken into account, and the precise distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is delineated on the basis of self‐determination and person–environment fit theories. Conditions are derived under which high wages attract able and motivated individuals, thus maximizing the average quality of care.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Fedele, 2018. "Well‐paid nurses are good nurses," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(4), pages 663-674, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:27:y:2018:i:4:p:663-674
    DOI: 10.1002/hec.3623
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    Cited by:

    1. Juliana Bernhofer & Alessandro Fedele & Mirco Tonin, 2022. "Wage Expectations and Access to Healthcare Occupations: Evidence from an Information Experiment," BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series BEMPS95, Faculty of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines

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