IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/hlthec/v27y2018i10p1594-1608.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Supplier‐induced demand for urgent after‐hours primary care services

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Longden
  • Jane Hall
  • Kees van Gool

Abstract

Australia is one of nine Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) countries that utilise deputising services to provide after‐hours primary care. While the provision of this service is supposed to be on behalf of regular general practitioners, businesses have adapted to the financial incentives on offer and are directly advertising their services to consumers emphasising patient convenience and no copayments. The introduction of corporate entities has changed the way that deputising services operate. We use a difference‐in‐difference approach to estimate the amount of growth in urgent after‐hours services that was not warranted by urgent medical need. These estimates are calculated by comparing the growth in urgent attendances that occurred during times of the day that are classified as “after‐hours” (e.g., 6 pm–11 pm Monday to Friday) with those that are classified as “unsociable‐hours” (e.g., 11 pm–7 am Monday to Friday). For the national level, we estimate that 593,141 unwarranted attendances were induced as urgent after‐hours consultations in a single year. This corresponds to a national estimate of the total benefits paid for unwarranted demand of approximately $77 million. While deputising services have filled a short‐fall in after‐hours services, the overuse of urgent items has meant that that this has been achieved at a considerable cost to the Australian Government.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Longden & Jane Hall & Kees van Gool, 2018. "Supplier‐induced demand for urgent after‐hours primary care services," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(10), pages 1594-1608, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:27:y:2018:i:10:p:1594-1608
    DOI: 10.1002/hec.3779
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3779
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/hec.3779?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Currie, Janet & Lin, Wanchuan & Zhang, Wei, 2011. "Patient knowledge and antibiotic abuse: Evidence from an audit study in China," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 933-949.
    2. Jacobson, Mireille G. & Chang, Tom Y. & Earle, Craig C. & Newhouse, Joseph P., 2017. "Physician agency and patient survival," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 27-47.
    3. Gruber, Jon & Kim, John & Mayzlin, Dina, 1999. "Physician fees and procedure intensity: the case of cesarean delivery," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 473-490, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Facchini, Gabriel, 2022. "Low staffing in the maternity ward: Keep calm and call the surgeon," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 370-394.
    2. Daniel Burkhard & Christian P. R. Schmid & Kaspar Wüthrich, 2019. "Financial incentives and physician prescription behavior: Evidence from dispensing regulations," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(9), pages 1114-1129, September.
    3. Lagarde, Mylène & Blaauw, Duane, 2022. "Overtreatment and benevolent provider moral hazard: Evidence from South African doctors," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    4. Erin M. Johnson & M. Marit Rehavi, 2016. "Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 115-141, February.
    5. Lagarde, Mylène & Blaauw, Duane, 2022. "Overtreatment and benevolent provider moral hazard: evidence from South African doctors," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115383, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Mujcic, Redzo & Frijters, Paul, 2013. "Still Not Allowed on the Bus: It Matters If You're Black or White!," IZA Discussion Papers 7300, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Kevin E. Pflum, 2015. "Physician Incentives and Treatment Choice," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 712-751, October.
    8. Gabriel A. Facchini Palma, 2020. "Low Staffing in the Maternity Ward: Keep Calm and Call the Surgeon," Working Papers wpdea2009, Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona.
    9. Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottlieb & Jeffrey Hicks, 2021. "How Would Medicare for All Affect Health System Capacity? Evidence from Medicare for Some," Tax Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 225-262.
    10. Wang, Jing & Gong, Yanhong & Wu, Jianxiong & Jiang, Nan & Chen, Zhenyuan & Yin, Xiaoxv, 2021. "Antibiotic dispensing patterns and patient interventions for upper respiratory tract infections by hospitals and retail pharmacies: A cross-sectional study based on standardized patients," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 272(C).
    11. Chen, Chun & Dong, Weizhen & Shen, Jay J. & Cochran, Christopher & Wang, Ying & Hao, Mo, 2014. "Is the prescribing behavior of Chinese physicians driven by financial incentives?," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 40-48.
    12. Amaral-Garcia, S.;, 2022. "Medical Device Companies and Doctors: Do their interactions affect medical treatments?," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 22/10, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
    13. Alpert, Abby & Duggan, Mark & Hellerstein, Judith K., 2013. "Perverse reverse price competition: Average wholesale prices and Medicaid pharmaceutical spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 44-62.
    14. Yongmin Chen & Jianpei Li & Jin Zhang, 2022. "Efficient Liability In Expert Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1717-1744, November.
    15. Maria Vittoria Levati & Ivan Soraperra & Saba Yifredew, 2023. "How to Curb Over-The-Counter Sales of Antibiotics? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Ethiopia," Working Papers 10/2023, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    16. Carine Milcent & Julie Rochut, 2009. "Tarification hospitalière et pratique médicale. La pratique de la césarienne en France," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 60(2), pages 489-506.
    17. Sandra Decker, 2007. "Medicaid physician fees and the quality of medical care of Medicaid patients in the USA," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 95-112, March.
    18. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter & Uwe Dulleck, 2009. "The Impact of Distributional Preferences on (Experimental) Markets for Expert Services," Working Papers 2009-28, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    19. Li‐Lin Liang, 2015. "Do Diagnosis‐Related Group‐Based Payments Incentivise Hospitals to Adjust Output Mix?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(4), pages 454-469, April.
    20. Gneezy, Uri & Saccardo, Silvia & Serra-Garcia, Marta & van Veldhuizen, Roel, 2020. "Bribing the Self," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 120, pages 311-324.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:27:y:2018:i:10:p:1594-1608. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/5749 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.