IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cai/recosp/reco_602_0489.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Tarification hospitalière et pratique médicale. La pratique de la césarienne en France

Author

Listed:
  • Carine Milcent
  • Julie Rochut

Abstract

Our study shows the impact of hospitals financing on Cesarean section practice in France in 2003. We make use of the hierarchical structure of the data set to take into account as many factors as possible which may influence medical practice. Our results show that private for profit hospitals financed on a fee-for-services basis perform significantly more cesarean sections than public hospitals and private non-for-proft hospitals financed by a global budget. When taking into account the structure the of medical staf, we find that the probability of performing a Cesarean section increases with the number of obstetricians per bed. We also notice that regional diferences in obstetrical practice in France remain. Classification JEL : I12, I18.

Suggested Citation

  • Carine Milcent & Julie Rochut, 2009. "Tarification hospitalière et pratique médicale. La pratique de la césarienne en France," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 60(2), pages 489-506.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_602_0489
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_602_0489
    Download Restriction: free
    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2009-2-page-489.htm
    Download Restriction: free
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniele Fabbri & Chiara Monfardini, 2008. "Style of practice and assortative mating: a recursive probit analysis of Caesarean section scheduling in Italy," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(11), pages 1411-1423.
    2. Jonathan Gruber & Maria Owings, 1996. "Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 99-123, Spring.
    3. Brown, H. III, 1996. "Physician demand for leisure: implications for cesarean section rates," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 233-242, April.
    4. Gruber, Jon & Kim, John & Mayzlin, Dina, 1999. "Physician fees and procedure intensity: the case of cesarean delivery," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 473-490, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Weeks, William B. & Jardin, Marie & Paraponaris, Alain, 2015. "Characteristics and patterns of elective admissions to for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals in France in 2009 and 2010," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 53-58.
    2. Alex Proshin & Alexandre Cazenave‐Lacroutz & Lise Rochaix, 2023. "Impact of tariff refinement on the choice between scheduled C‐section and normal delivery: Evidence from France," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(7), pages 1397-1433, July.
    3. Ahcène Zehnati & Marwân-al-Qays Bousmah & Mohammad Abu-Zaineh, 2021. "Public–private differentials in health care delivery: the case of cesarean deliveries in Algeria," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 367-385, September.
    4. Weeks, William B. & Paraponaris, Alain & Ventelou, Bruno, 2014. "Geographic variation in rates of common surgical procedures in France in 2008–2010, and comparison to the US and Britain," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 215-221.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Francese, Maura & Piacenza, Massimiliano & Romanelli, Marzia & Turati, Gilberto, 2014. "Understanding inappropriateness in health spending: The role of regional policies and institutions in caesarean deliveries," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 262-277.
    2. Carine Milcent & Saad Zbiri, 2022. "Supplementary private health insurance: The impact of physician financial incentives on medical practice," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(1), pages 57-72, January.
    3. Bachner, Florian & Halla, Martin & Pruckner, Gerald J., 2024. "Do Empty Beds Cause Cesarean Deliveries?," IZA Discussion Papers 16981, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Aleksandr Proshin & Alexandre Cazenave-Lacroutz & Zeynep Or & Lise Rochaix, 2018. "Impact of Diagnosis Related Group Refinement on the Choice Between Scheduled Caesarean Section and Normal Delivery: Recent Evidence from France," PSE Working Papers halshs-01812107, HAL.
    5. De Luca, Giacomo & Lisi, Domenico & Martorana, Marco & Siciliani, Luigi, 2021. "Does higher Institutional Quality improve the Appropriateness of Healthcare Provision?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    6. Alejandro Arrieta & Ariadna García-Prado, 2012. "Non-elective cesarean sections in public hospitals: hospital capacity constraints and doctor´s incentives," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 1212, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
    7. Sofia Amaral-Garcia & Paola Bertoli & Veronica Grembi, 2015. "Does Experience Rating Improve Obstetric Practices? Evidence From Geographical Discontinuities in Italy," CEIS Research Paper 342, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 08 May 2015.
    8. Alejandro Arrieta & Ariadna García Prado, 2016. "Non-elective C-sections in public hospitals: capacity constraints and doctor incentives," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(49), pages 4719-4731, October.
    9. Lo, Joan C., 2008. "Financial incentives do not always work--An example of cesarean sections in Taiwan," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 121-129, October.
    10. Ke-Zong Ma & Edward Norton & Shoou-Yih Lee, 2011. "Mind the information gap: fertility rate and use of cesarean delivery and tocolytic hospitalizations in Taiwan," Health Economics Review, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-15, December.
    11. Karen Norberg & Juan Pantano, 2016. "Cesarean sections and subsequent fertility," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 29(1), pages 5-37, January.
    12. Karen Norberg & Juan Pantano, 2016. "Cesarean sections and subsequent fertility," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 29(1), pages 5-37, January.
    13. Barili, Emilia & Bertoli, Paola & Grembi, Veronica, 2021. "Fee equalization and appropriate health care," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
    14. Halla, Martin & Mayr, Harald & Pruckner, Gerald J. & García-Gómez, Pilar, 2020. "Cutting fertility? Effects of cesarean deliveries on subsequent fertility and maternal labor supply," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    15. Gabriel A. Facchini Palma, 2020. "Low Staffing in the Maternity Ward: Keep Calm and Call the Surgeon," Working Papers wpdea2009, Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona.
    16. Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottlieb & Jeffrey Hicks, 2021. "How Would Medicare for All Affect Health System Capacity? Evidence from Medicare for Some," Tax Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 225-262.
    17. Thomas Buchmueller & John C. Ham & Lara D. Shore-Sheppard, 2015. "The Medicaid Program," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, Volume 1, pages 21-136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Grant, Darren, 2022. "The “Quiet Revolution” and the cesarean section in the United States," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 47(C).
    19. de Elejalde, Ramiro & Giolito, Eugenio, 2021. "A demand-smoothing incentive for cesarean deliveries," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    20. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter & Uwe Dulleck, 2009. "The Impact of Distributional Preferences on (Experimental) Markets for Expert Services," Working Papers 2009-28, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_602_0489. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cairn.info/revue-economique.htm .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.