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The market for general counsel

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  • Dhruv Chand Aggarwal

Abstract

This paper presents the first systematic descriptive study of the market for general counsel (GCs) in publicly traded US companies. Using a hand‐collected dataset, I track the backgrounds and careers of 3409 GCs, and establish basic facts about the hiring, firing, demographics, and politics of inhouse counsel. Most GCs are outsiders to their companies, not having previously worked in subordinate positions within the legal department or served as external counsel. I find that the share of women GCs has risen sharply over time, with GCs now about five times as likely to be female as chief executive officers (CEOs). GCs have also become more Democratic‐leaning over time, in sharp contrast to business‐side employees such as CEOs. GC tenures have decreased significantly over time. Outsider GCs are especially likely to be fired from their positions, controlling for biographical details, firm financials, and alleged misconduct by their employer.

Suggested Citation

  • Dhruv Chand Aggarwal, 2023. "The market for general counsel," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(4), pages 895-940, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:20:y:2023:i:4:p:895-940
    DOI: 10.1111/jels.12366
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