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Rising Through the Ranks: The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Executives, 1936–2003

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  • Carola Frydman

    (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208; National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138)

Abstract

I present new stylized facts on the market for managers over the twentieth century, utilizing a novel data set on managerial careers. From the 1930s to the mid-1970s, the level of executive pay, inequality among executives across and within firms, and mobility were low. These patterns have reversed since then. I document that an increase in the importance of general managerial human capital can account for this change. The level of general skills, measured by the type of education and occupational mobility of managers, correlate with higher pay and turnover. Other factors may have also contributed to these changes, but the labor market for managers has likely played an important role.

Suggested Citation

  • Carola Frydman, 2019. "Rising Through the Ranks: The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Executives, 1936–2003," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(11), pages 4951-4979, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:65:y:2019:i:11:p:4951-4979
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3080
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    4. Stephen Hansen & Tejas Ramdas & Raffaella Sadun & Joe Fuller, 2021. "The Demand for Executive Skills," NBER Working Papers 28959, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Fernando Núñez & Ángel Arcos-Vargas & Carlos Usabiaga & Pablo Álvarez-de-Toledo, 2022. "On directors’ compensation: a multilevel analysis of Spanish listed companies," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 63(4), pages 2173-2207, October.
    6. Juan A. Correa & Francisco Parro & Rafael Sánchez, 2023. "The Distributional Effect of Trade on the CEO Market," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 90(357), pages 111-139, January.
    7. Xu, Jing & Li, Haizheng, 2023. "Managerial human capital and corporate R&D investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 213(C), pages 151-171.
    8. Liu, Yun & Nanda, Vikram & Onal, Bunyamin & Silveri, Sabatino, 2021. "Employment mobility and pay for sector performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    9. Joel HELLIER, 2021. "Globalization and Inequality in Advanced Economies: A Provisional Assessment," Working Papers 575, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
    10. Na, Ke, 2020. "CEOs’ outside opportunities and relative performance evaluation: evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(3), pages 679-700.
    11. Ester Manna, 2023. "Bad NGOs? Competition in the market for donations and workers' misconduct," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2023/457, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    12. Liyan Shi, 2023. "Optimal Regulation of Noncompete Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(2), pages 425-463, March.
    13. Stefano Colonnello & Giuliano Curatola & Shuo Xia, 2022. "Trading Away Incentives," Working Papers 2022:16, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    14. Kallias, Antonios & Kallias, Konstantinos & Tsalkamas, Ioannis & Zhang, Song, 2023. "One size does not fit all: The conditional role of CEO education on IPO performance," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    15. Baghdadi, Ghasan A. & Safiullah, Md & Heyden, Mariano L.M., 2023. "Do gender diverse boards enhance managerial ability?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    16. Amore, Mario Daniele & Schwenen, Sebastian, 2020. "The Value of Luck in the Labor Market for CEOs," CEPR Discussion Papers 14839, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Chen Cohen & Ori Zax, 2022. "Human capital acquisition as a signaling device in promotion competition," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(2), pages 550-566, May.
    18. Dupuy, Arnaud & Kennes, John & Lyng, Ran Sun, 2021. "The Market for CEOs: Building Legacy and Feeling Empowered Matter," IZA Discussion Papers 14803, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2023. "Talent discovery and poaching under asymmetric information," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 116044, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    20. Joël Hellier, 2022. "Asymmetric Globalization and Top Performers Income," Working Papers REM 2022/0242, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa.
    21. Marie Lalanne, 2023. "Network‐based appointments and board diversity," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 90(358), pages 409-452, April.
    22. Joel Hellier, 2023. "Asymmetric Globalization, Top Performers’ Income and Inequality," Working Papers 634, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
    23. Joel HELLIER, 2023. "Increasing skill premium and education decisions: Higher intra-skilled inequality and lower inter-skill mobility," Working Papers 643, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
    24. Wang, Cheng & Yang, Youzhi, 2022. "Optimal CEO turnover," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).

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