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Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy

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  • Ronald W. Masulis
  • Syed Walid Reza

Abstract

Evaluating agency theory and optimal contracting theory views of corporate philanthropy, we find that as corporate giving increases, shareholders reduce their valuation of firm cash holdings. Dividend increases following the 2003 Tax Reform Act are associated with reduced corporate giving. Using a natural experiment, we find that corporate giving is positively (negatively) associated with CEO charity preferences (CEO shareholdings and corporate governance quality). Evidence from CEO-affiliated charity donations, market reactions to insider-affiliated donations, its relation to CEO compensation, and firm contributions to director-affiliated charities indicates that corporate donations advance CEO interests and suggests misuses of corporate resources that reduce firm value.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronald W. Masulis & Syed Walid Reza, 2015. "Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(2), pages 592-636.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:28:y:2015:i:2:p:592-636.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhu082
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