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How the Workplace Affects Employee Political Contributions

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  • STUCKATZ, JAN

Abstract

How important is the workplace for employees’ political donations? Contrary to research on workplace political mobilization, existing work assumes that most individual donors contribute ideologically. I link donations of employees and Political Action Committees (PACs) from 12,737 U.S. public companies between 2003 and 2018 to show that 16.7% of employee donations go to employer-PAC-supported candidates. I investigate the dynamics between employee and PAC donations within firm–legislator pairs over time and find that both rank-and-file employees and executives contribute more dollars to company-supported politicians. Firm–employee donation alignment is stronger on powerful and ideologically moderate politicians with high value for the employer. Results from a difference-in-differences design further show modest changes in the partisan composition of employee donations after swift changes in the partisan donations of corporate PACs. The results suggest investment-related rather than ideological motives for alignment and highlight the importance of corporations for money in politics.

Suggested Citation

  • Stuckatz, Jan, 2022. "How the Workplace Affects Employee Political Contributions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 116(1), pages 54-69, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:116:y:2022:i:1:p:54-69_5
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    Cited by:

    1. Dhruv Chand Aggarwal, 2023. "The market for general counsel," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(4), pages 895-940, December.
    2. Choi, Dahyun & Lee, Kyuwon, 2024. "Diminishing Regulatory Capacity and Corporate Political Disengagement: Evidence from State-Level Workforce Shocks," OSF Preprints ymqds, Center for Open Science.
    3. Egerod, Benjamin C. K. & Aaskoven, Lasse, 2024. "Why don't firms lobby? How information shapes the market for lobbying services," Working Papers 347, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    4. Spencer Barnes, 2024. "Discrimination announcements, employee opinion, and capital structure: Evidence from the EEOC," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 59(3), pages 745-777, August.
    5. Balán, Pablo & Dodyk, Juan & Puente, Ignacio, 2023. "Kin in the game: How family ties help firms overcome campaign finance regulation," Working Papers 330, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.

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