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Some Aspects of Economic Analysis of Out-of-court Settlement in the Dispute of Negative Expected Value – Case of Republic of Serbia

Author

Listed:
  • Cedomir GLIGORIC

    (Belgrade Business and Arts Academy of Applied Studies, Belgrade, Serbia)

  • Milos PAVLOVIC

    (Belgrade Business and Arts Academy of Applied Studies, Belgrade, Serbia)

  • Jana CVIJIC RODIC

    (Belgrade Business and Arts Academy of Applied Studies, Belgrade, Serbia)

  • Sanja DONCIC

    (Belgrade Business and Arts Academy of Applied Studies, Belgrade, Serbia)

  • Nikola VUJANOVIC

    (Belgrade Business and Arts Academy of Applied Studies, Belgrade, Serbia)

Abstract

The main goal of a potential plaintiff who initiates a negative expected value dispute is to try to reach an agreement on an out-of- court settlement. The paper analyzes the behavior of parties in negative value disputes in the Republic of Serbia. The objective of this paper is to show economic analysis of out of court settlement; 1) in condition of symmetrical information and 2) in condition of asymmetrical information. First of all, we will present the literature regarding this topic using the historical analysis and synthesis method, after that, by using the methods of deduction and induction, descriptive, comparative and other scientific methods, on a case of Republic of Serbia we will show research problem. At the end we will give the results in conclusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Cedomir GLIGORIC & Milos PAVLOVIC & Jana CVIJIC RODIC & Sanja DONCIC & Nikola VUJANOVIC, 2023. "Some Aspects of Economic Analysis of Out-of-court Settlement in the Dispute of Negative Expected Value – Case of Republic of Serbia," Business & Management Compass, University of Economics Varna, issue 1, pages 80-95.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrn:journl:y:2023:i:1:p:80-95
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic analysis; out of court settlement; Republic of Serbia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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