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Justice: Greater Access, Lower Costs

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  • Margherita Saraceno

    (University of Milano-Bicocca
    Università Bocconi)

Abstract

This study explicitly elucidates the relationship between litigation and access to justice. In considering access issues, this study shows that the effects of policies affecting parties’ litigation decisions partially depart from those in the standard literature. For instance, increasing parties’ litigation costs does not necessarily promote settlement. Rather, the effects depend on the elasticity of the demand for legal remedies. Furthermore, even while pushing litigation, enhancing access to justice is efficient as long as the claimant’s marginal propensity to litigate is smaller than the social opportunity-cost of access to justice. This finding offers further insight into the suitability of litigation subsidization.

Suggested Citation

  • Margherita Saraceno, 2018. "Justice: Greater Access, Lower Costs," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 4(2), pages 283-312, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:italej:v:4:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s40797-017-0059-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s40797-017-0059-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Access to justice; Elasticity; Legal aid; Litigation; Settlement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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