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The incentive effects of litigation fee shifting when legal standards are uncertain

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  • Beckner, Clinton III
  • Katz, Avery

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  • Beckner, Clinton III & Katz, Avery, 1995. "The incentive effects of litigation fee shifting when legal standards are uncertain," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 205-224, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:15:y:1995:i:2:p:205-224
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    1. Hylton, Keith N., 1990. "The influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and under negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 161-171, September.
    2. Hause, John C, 1989. "Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 157-179, January.
    3. Bowles, Roger, 1987. "Settlement Range and Cost Allocation Rules: A Comment on Avery Katz's Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 177-184, Fall.
    4. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1989. "Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 99-108, Spring.
    5. Hughes, James W & Snyder, Edward A, 1995. "Litigation and Settlement under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 225-250, April.
    6. Snyder, Edward A & Hughes, James W, 1990. "The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 345-380, Fall.
    7. William M. Landes, 1974. "An Economic Analysis of the Courts," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 164-214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, 1984. "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-56, January.
    9. Rosenberg, D. & Shavell, S., 1985. "A model in which suits are brought for their nuisance value," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-13, June.
    10. Fournier, Gary M & Zuehlke, Thomas W, 1989. "Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical Approach," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 71(2), pages 189-195, May.
    11. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 1988. "Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 437-450, June.
    12. Louis Kaplow, 1993. "Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 625-630, Winter.
    13. Hylton, Keith N, 1990. "Costly Litigation and Legal Error under Negligence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 433-452, Fall.
    14. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1988. "The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 151-164, January.
    15. Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
    16. Katz, Avery, 1987. "Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 143-176, Fall.
    17. Kahan, Marcel, 1989. "Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 427-447, June.
    18. Shavell, Steven, 1995. "Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 1-28, January.
    19. Katz, Avery, 1990. "The effect of frivolous lawsuits on the settlement of litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 3-27, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Baptiste Massenot & Maria Maraki & Christian Thoeni, 2016. "Legal compliance and litigation spending under the English and American rule: Experimental evidence," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 16.19, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    2. Gomez, Fernando & Penalva, Jose, 2015. "Tort reform and the theory of coordinating tort and insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 83-97.
    3. Daniela Marchesi, 2007. "The Rule Incentives that Rule Civil Justice," ISAE Working Papers 85, ISTAT - Italian National Institute of Statistics - (Rome, ITALY).
    4. Peter Van Wijck & Jan Winters, 2001. "The Principle of Full Compensation in Tort Law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 319-332, May.
    5. Ian A. MacKenzie, 2014. "Precaution with endogenous litigation choices," Discussion Papers Series 535, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.

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