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Regulación económica: un enfoque "principal-agente" de la relación entre el estado, el regulador y la empresa regulada

Author

Listed:
  • Alberto Porto
  • Santiago Urbiztondo

Abstract

En este trabajo se realiza un análisis teórico de la regulación económica, poniendo énfasis en las distorsiones (y el costo de sus soluciones) que se generan por la presencia de asimetrías en la información disponible para la firma regulada, los reguladores, y la sociedad, remarcando asimismo las dificultades resultantes de la incapacidad de convenir comportamientos futuros a partir del surgimiento de nueva información o de la posibilidad de comportamientos oportunistas ante decisiones irreversibles. Estas consideraciones se ven reflejadas al observar la evolución paralela que han seguido en la Argentina el contralor de las empresas públicas y el aumento en los requerimientos informativos.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Porto & Santiago Urbiztondo, 1993. "Regulación económica: un enfoque "principal-agente" de la relación entre el estado, el regulador y la empresa regulada," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 20(2 Year 19), pages 303-327, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:20:y:1993:i:2:p:303-327
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Spiller, Pablo T, 1990. "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed."," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 65-101, April.
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