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La autonomía de los entes reguladores argentinos: Agua y cloacas, gas natural, energía eléctrica y telecomunicaciones

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  • Urbiztondo, Santiago
  • Navajas, Fernando
  • Artana, Daniel

Abstract

En este estudio se analizan los efectos de la discriminación residencial por motivos étnicos sobre los resultados de ingreso y formación en ciudades de Bolivia. Del análisis se destacan tres resultados. En primer lugar, se descubren efectos significativos y negativos de la discriminación sobre la generación de ingresos tanto en comparaciones entre ciudades como en el interior de las ciudades. En segundo lugar, se descubre que las interacciones a nivel del individuo y del vecindario entre la etnicidad y la discriminación guardan una correlación significativa y negativa con el ingreso y el logro escolar. Por último, se descubren efectos positivos sobre el capital social en el caso de inmigrantes recientes y trabajadores jóvenes y efectos sobre el capital humano negativos en el caso de trabajadores no inmigrantes y de más edad. Se trata de controlar los sesgos de selección con tres instrumentos de discriminación residencial. También se incluyen factores potenciales de determinación intergeneracional del ingreso y la formación mediante medidas ampliadas de capital humano de los padres y capital social.

Suggested Citation

  • Urbiztondo, Santiago & Navajas, Fernando & Artana, Daniel, 1998. "La autonomía de los entes reguladores argentinos: Agua y cloacas, gas natural, energía eléctrica y telecomunicaciones," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6118, Inter-American Development Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:6118
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Manuel A. Abdala, 2001. "Institutions, Contracts And Regulation Of Infrastructure In Argentina," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 4, pages 217-254, November.

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