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A Political Model of Monetary Policy with Application to the Real Fed Funds Rate

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  • Caporale, Tony
  • Grier, Kevin B

Abstract

We construct an empirical model of U.S. monetary policy assuming that the Federal Reserve is an ordinary federal bureaucracy. We use the real Federal Funds rate as our policy measure and show the existence of significant executive, legislative, and bureaucratic influence on the real rate of interest from 1961 to 1996. We find that presidential party is an adequate statistical measure of executive influence and that the voting scores of the Senate Banking Committee leadership best represent legislative influence. We argue that political changes cause systematic and predictable changes in monetary policy. Copyright 1998 by the University of Chicago.

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  • Caporale, Tony & Grier, Kevin B, 1998. "A Political Model of Monetary Policy with Application to the Real Fed Funds Rate," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 409-428, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:41:y:1998:i:2:p:409-28
    DOI: 10.1086/467395
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    2. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
    3. Dino Falaschetti, 2003. "Does Partisan Heritage Matter? The Case of the Federal Reserve," Microeconomics 0311003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. repec:dgr:rugsom:14020-eef is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    6. Jorge Hargrave Gonçalves Da Silva, 2014. "Partisan Politics And Country Risk: Evidence From The 2002 Brazilian Presidential Election," Anais do XL Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 40th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 041, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    7. Gerard H. Kuper, 2018. "The powers that are: central bank independence in the Greenspan era," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 485-499, March.
    8. Kim, Iljoong & Kim, Inbae, 2007. "Endogenous selection of monetary institutions: With the case of discount windows and bureaucratic discretion," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 330-350, September.
    9. Kim, Iljoong & Kim, Inbae, 2008. "Interest group pressure explanations for the yen-dollar exchange rate movements: Focusing on the 1980s," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 364-382, September.
    10. Kuper, Gerard & Veurink, Jan Hessel, 2014. "Central bank independence and political pressure in the Greenspan era," Research Report 14020-EEF, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).

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