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The Objectives and Priorities of Monetary Policy under Different Federal Reserve Chairmen

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  • Hakes, David R

Abstract

This paper utilizes a monetary policy reaction function that relates policy intentions to forecasts of policy objectives. Estimates of this reaction function over the post-Accord period suggest that the Burns period was unique. While the Martin and Volcker periods were extremely similar, the Burns period was structurally distinct from both the Martin and Volcker periods. Further, model specifications that allow for an independent influence on monetary policy from different presidential administrations also imply that there are significant differences in monetary policy under different Fed chairmen. Copyright 1990 by Ohio State University Press.

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  • Hakes, David R, 1990. "The Objectives and Priorities of Monetary Policy under Different Federal Reserve Chairmen," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(3), pages 327-337, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:22:y:1990:i:3:p:327-37
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    Cited by:

    1. Fuhrer, Jeff & Tootell, Geoff, 2008. "Eyes on the prize: How did the fed respond to the stock market?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 796-805, May.
    2. Henry Chappell & Rob McGregor & Todd Vermilyea, 2007. "The persuasive power of a Committee Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 103-112, July.
    3. Gamber, Edward N. & Hakes, David R., 2006. "The Taylor rule and the appointment cycle of the chairperson of the Federal Reserve," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 55-66.
    4. Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1991. "Are district presidents more conservative than board governors?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 3-12.
    5. Donato Masciandaro, 2012. "Determinants of Financial Supervision Regimes: Markets, Institutions, Politics, Law or Geography?," Chapters, in: Kern Alexander & Rahul Dhumale (ed.), Research Handbook on International Financial Regulation, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Shen, Chung-Hua & Lin, Kun-Li & Guo, Na, 2016. "Hawk or dove: Switching regression model for the monetary policy reaction function in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 94-111.
    7. Masciandaro, Donato, 2007. "Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 285-315, June.
    8. Ruby Kishan & Timothy Opiela, 2000. "Further evidence on monetary and fiscal policy coordination," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 6(4), pages 672-685, November.
    9. Bayar Omer, 2015. "An ordered probit analysis of monetary policy inertia," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 705-726, July.
    10. Choi, Woon Gyu, 1999. "Estimating the Discount Rate Policy Reaction Function of the Monetary Authority," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(4), pages 379-401, July-Aug..
    11. Vanderhart, Peter G., 2000. "The Federal Reserve's Reaction Function under Greenspan: An Ordinal Probit Analysis," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 631-644, October.
    12. Caporale, Tony & Grier, Kevin B, 1998. "A Political Model of Monetary Policy with Application to the Real Fed Funds Rate," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 409-428, October.
    13. Lansing, Kevin J. & Trehan, Bharat, 2003. "Forward-looking behavior and optimal discretionary monetary policy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 249-256, November.
    14. Qin, Ting & Enders, Walter, 2008. "In-sample and out-of-sample properties of linear and nonlinear Taylor rules," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 428-443, March.
    15. Daniel Aromí & Daniel Heymann, 2024. "Talk to Fed: a Big Dive into FOMC Transcripts," Working Papers 323, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    16. Gamber, Edward N. & Hakes, David R., 1995. "Do shifts in federal reserve policy regimes explain interest rate anomalies?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 227-240.
    17. Shiu-Sheng Chen & Chun-Chieh Wang, 2014. "Do Politics Cause Regime Shifts In Monetary Policy?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 492-502, April.
    18. Adam T. Jones & Mathew W. Snyder, 2014. "Federal Reserve independence: the Fed Funds Rate under different regimes," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(18), pages 1262-1265, December.
    19. Alexander Dentler, 2019. "Did the fed raise interest rates before elections?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 239-273, December.
    20. Shen, Chung-Hua & Hakes, david R., 1995. "Monetary policy as a decision-making hierarchy: The case of Taiwan," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 357-368.
    21. Chung‐Hua Shen & David R. Hakes & Kenneth Brown, 1999. "Time‐Varying Response of Monetary Policy to Macroeconomic Conditions," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(3), pages 584-593, January.

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