Congressional supervision of monetary policy
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- Gerald Scully & D. Slottje, 1989. "The paradox of politics and policy in redistributing income," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 55-70, January.
- Goutsmedt, Aurélien & Sergi, Francesco & Guizzo, Danielle, 2019.
"An Agenda without a Plan: Robert E. Lucas's Trajectory throught the Public Debate,"
OSF Preprints
7jpa9, Center for Open Science.
- Aurélien Goutsmedt & Danielle Guizzo & Francesco Sergi, 2019. "An Agenda without a Plan. Robert E. Lucas’s Trajectory through the Public Debate [Un programme sans plan. La trajectoire de Robert E. Lucas à travers le débat public]," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03228955, HAL.
- Aurélien Goutsmedt & Danielle Guizzo & Francesco Sergi, 2019. "An Agenda without a Plan. Robert E. Lucas’s Trajectory through the Public Debate [Un programme sans plan. La trajectoire de Robert E. Lucas à travers le débat public]," Post-Print hal-03228955, HAL.
- Neil Skaggs & Cheryl Wasserkrug, 1983. "Banking sector influence on the relationship of Congress to the Federal Reserve System," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 295-306, January.
- Dodge Cahan & Luisa Doerr & Niklas Potrafke, 2019.
"Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 215-238, December.
- Dodge Cahan & Luisa Dörr & Niklas Potrafke, 2019. "Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries," ifo Working Paper Series 296, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
- Cahan, Dodge & Doerr, Luisa & Potrafke, Niklas, 2019. "Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries," Munich Reprints in Economics 78247, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Dodge Cahan & Luisa Dörr & Niklas Potrafke & Luisa Dörr, 2019. "Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 7549, CESifo.
- Peter J. Boettke & Alexander W. Salter & Daniel J. Smith, 2018. "Money as meta-rule: Buchanan’s constitutional economics as a foundation for monetary stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 529-555, September.
- Thomas Havrilesky, 1994. "Outside Influences On Monetary Policy: A Summary Of Recent Findings," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 12(1), pages 46-51, January.
- Alesina, Alberto & Sachs, Jeffrey, 1988.
"Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(1), pages 63-82, February.
- Alberto Alesina & Jeffrey Sachs, 1986. "Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984," NBER Working Papers 1940, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sachs, Jeffrey & Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984," Scholarly Articles 4553026, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Pablo Paniagua, 2016. "The robust political economy of central banking and free banking," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 29(1), pages 15-32, March.
- Wm. Mounts & Clifford Sowell & James Lindley, 1985. "Rent-seeking over time: The continuity of capture," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 87-94, January.
- Thomas Mayer, "undated".
"Why Was The Fed So Inflationary In The 1960s And 1970s?,"
Department of Economics
96-10, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- Thomas Mayer, 2003. "Why was the Fed so Inflationary in the 1960s and 1970s?," Working Papers 32, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Caporale, Tony & Grier, Kevin B, 1998. "A Political Model of Monetary Policy with Application to the Real Fed Funds Rate," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 409-428, October.
- Alberto Alesina, 1987.
"Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(3), pages 651-678.
- Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1993.
"Central bank independence : Theory and evidence (Revised version),"
Other publications TiSEM
a26d2af2-01f7-4f0f-b2e9-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1993. "Central bank independence : Theory and evidence (Revised version)," Discussion Paper 1993-25, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Chappell, Henry Jr. & Havrilesky, Thomas M. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 1995. "Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 113-136, May.
- Robert D. Auerbach, 1991. "Institutional Preservation At The Federal Reserve," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 9(3), pages 46-58, July.
- Gumus, Erdal, 2003. "Crowding-Out Hypothesis versus Ricardian Equivalence Proposition: Evidence from Literature," MPRA Paper 42141, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Leroy Laney & Thomas Willett, 1983. "Presidential politics, budget deficits, and monetary policy in the United States; 1960–1976," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 53-69, January.
- Peter J. Boettke & Daniel J. Smith, 2016. "Evolving views on monetary policy in the thought of Hayek, Friedman, and Buchanan," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 29(4), pages 351-370, December.
- José I. Garcia de Paso, 1996. "A partisan model of political monetary cycles," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(2), pages 243-262, May.
- Anthony Barrett, 1991. "Reforming The Fed: Its Independence And Lessons From Humphrey‐Hawkins," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 9(3), pages 76-81, July.
- George Selgin, 2014. "Operation Twist-the-Truth: How the Federal Reserve Misrepresents Its History and Performance," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 34(2), pages 229-263, Spring/Su.
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