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Monetary and Fiscal Constitutions and the Bureaucratic Behavior of the Federal Reserve

Author

Listed:
  • William J. Boyes

    (Arizona State University)

  • William Stewart Mounts JR

    (Mercer University)

  • Clifford Sowell

    (Berea College)

Abstract

A body of literature has developed that models the Federal Reserve as a self- interested bureaucracy, and not simply as an altruistic bureau guided only by a concern with the public interest. This literature focuses on the monetary constitution—the institutional arrangements and relationships under which the Federal Reserve operates. However, the Federal Reserve also operates under a fiscal constitution (the institutional arrangements that guide development of a federal budget). This is because the Federal Reserve is an agent of Congress. Unfortunately, this important principal-agent relationship has not been incorpo rated into the examinations of the bureaucratic behavior of the Federal Reserve. The purpose of this article is to reexamine the Federal Reserve's tendency to engage in expense-preference behavior while controlling for both monetary and fiscal constitutions.

Suggested Citation

  • William J. Boyes & William Stewart Mounts JR & Clifford Sowell, 1998. "Monetary and Fiscal Constitutions and the Bureaucratic Behavior of the Federal Reserve," Public Finance Review, , vol. 26(6), pages 548-564, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:26:y:1998:i:6:p:548-564
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219802600602
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D, 1983. "Preliminary Evidence on the Use of Inputs by the Federal Reserve System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 291-304, June.
    2. Hannan, Timothy H, 1979. "Expense-Preference Behavior in Banking: A Reexamination," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(4), pages 891-895, August.
    3. Strong, John S, 1984. "The Use of Inputs by the Federal Reserve System: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 1118-1120, December.
    4. Friedman, Milton, 1982. "Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 14(1), pages 98-118, February.
    5. Varian, Hal R., 1990. "Goodness-of-fit in optimizing models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1-2), pages 125-140.
    6. Boyes, William J & Mounts, William Stewart & Sowell, Clifford, 1988. "The Federal Reserve as a Bureaucracy: An Examination of Expense-Preference Behavior," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(2), pages 181-190, May.
    7. Timothy H. Hannan & Ferdinand Mavinga, 1980. "Expense Preference and Managerial Control: the Case of the Banking Firm," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 671-682, Autumn.
    8. Friedman, Milton, 1982. "Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice: A Reply," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 14(3), pages 404-406, August.
    9. Toma, Mark, 1982. "Inflationary bias of the Federal Reserve System : A bureaucratic perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 163-190.
    10. Edwards, Franklin R, 1977. "Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries: Expense-Preference Behavior in Banking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 147-162, February.
    11. Boyd, John H, 1984. "The Use of Inputs by the Federal Reserve System: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 1114-1117, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mixon, Franklin Jr. & Upadhyaya, Kamal P., 2004. "Examining legislative challenges to central bank autonomy: macroeconomic and agency costs models," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 415-428.

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