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Multiperiod Wage Contracts and Productivity Profiles

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  • Bernhardt, Dan
  • Timmis, Gerald C

Abstract

When creditors do not honor human capital as collateral, firms can mediate financially by offering workers long-term wage contracts. The optimal contract specifies a wage consisting of a spot general skill component plus a component equal to the expected time-averaged value of the worker's specific skills with a competitor. Variations in the smoothed specific component are due only to changes in expectation about the likelihood of quitting a competing firm. The theory also explains interindustry disparities in wage paths and statistical discrimination by firms. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernhardt, Dan & Timmis, Gerald C, 1990. "Multiperiod Wage Contracts and Productivity Profiles," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(4), pages 529-563, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:8:y:1990:i:4:p:529-63
    DOI: 10.1086/298233
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    Cited by:

    1. Qian, Nancy & Lagakos, David & Moll, Benjamin & Porzio, Tommaso, 2012. "Experience Matters: Human Capital and Development Accounting," CEPR Discussion Papers 9253, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Luigi Guiso & Luigi Pistaferri & Fabiano Schivardi, 2013. "Credit within the Firm," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(1), pages 211-247.
    3. Barth, Erling, 1997. "Firm-Specific Seniority and Wages," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(3), pages 495-506, July.
    4. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran & Raphael Soubeyran, 2014. "Knowledge acquisition within an organization: How to retain a knowledge worker using wage profile and non-monotonic knowledge accumulation," CIRANO Working Papers 2014s-32, CIRANO.
    5. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran & Raphael Soubeyran, 2014. "Knowledge Accumulation Within An Organization," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(4), pages 1089-1128, November.
    6. Atsuko Tanaka, "undated". "Who bears the cost of workers' health-related presenteeism and absenteeism," Working Papers 2016-31, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 10 May 2016.
    7. Lam, Kit-Chun & Liu, Pak-Wai & Wong, Yue-Chim, 1995. "Wage structure when wage offers are private," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 19-32, March.
    8. Scoones, David, 2000. "Matching and competition for human capital," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 135-152, March.
    9. Lam, Kit-Chun & Liu, Pak-Wai, 2000. "Verifiable wage offers and recontracting: effect on wage and consumption profiles," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 449-462, July.
    10. Scoones, David & Bernhardt, Dan, 1998. "Promotion, Turnover, and Discretionary Human Capital Acquisition," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 122-141, January.

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