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Wage Bargaining, Labor Turnover, and the Business Cycle: A Model with Asymmetric Information

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  • Perry, Motty
  • Solon, Gary

Abstract

This paper presents a wage bargaining model in which the employer and employee are each uncertain about the other's reservation wage. Under specified circumstances, the model's equilibrium is shown to involve unilateral wage setting and inefficient labor turnover. In addition, aggregate demand shocks affect the equilibrium in a way that produces procyclical quits and countercyclical layoffs.These results are obtained without resorting to assumptions of nominal wage rigidity, long-term contracting, or aggregate price misperceptions.
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  • Perry, Motty & Solon, Gary, 1985. "Wage Bargaining, Labor Turnover, and the Business Cycle: A Model with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(4), pages 421-433, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:3:y:1985:i:4:p:421-33
    DOI: 10.1086/298063
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1981. "Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 301-307, May.
    3. Okun, Arthur M, 1980. "Rational-Expectations-with-Misperceptions as a Theory of the Business Cycle," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(4), pages 817-825, November.
    4. Ehrenberg, Ronald G & Danziger, Leif & San, Gee, 1983. "Cost-of-Living Adjustment Clauses in Union Contracts: A Summary of Results," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(3), pages 215-245, July.
    5. Hall, Robert E & Lazear, Edward P, 1984. "The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(2), pages 233-257, April.
    6. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "Second Thoughts on Keynesian Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 54-59, May.
    7. Walter Y. Oi, 1962. "Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(6), pages 538-538.
    8. Gary S. Becker, 1962. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," NBER Chapters, in: Investment in Human Beings, pages 9-49, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(1), pages 3-35.
    10. Perry, Motty, 1986. "An Example of Price Formation in Bilateral Situations: A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 313-321, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Steven J. Davis & Pawel M. Krolikowski, 2023. "Sticky Wages on the Layoff Margin," NBER Working Papers 31528, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Pedro S. Martins & Gary Solon & Jonathan Thomas, 2010. "Measuring What Employers Really Do about Entry Wages over the Business Cycle," NBER Working Papers 15767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Pedro S. Martins & Gary Solon & Jonathan P. Thomas, 2012. "Measuring What Employers Do about Entry Wages over the Business Cycle: A New Approach," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 36-55, October.

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