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Contract Form, Wage Flexibility, and Employment

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Listed:
  • Thomas Lemieux
  • W. Bentley MacLeod
  • Daniel Parent

Abstract

We begin with two uncontroversial hypotheses - firm productivity is expensive to measure and employment entails relationship-specific investments. These assumptions imply that firms would optimally choose fixed-wage contracts, and complement these with bonus pay when measuring employee performance is not too costly. These assumptions imply that under an optimal employment contract hours of work is less responsive, while total compensation is more responsive to shocks under bonus-pay contracts compared to fixed wage contracts. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) where shocks are proxied using the local unemployment rate, we find strong support for these two implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Lemieux & W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 2012. "Contract Form, Wage Flexibility, and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 526-531, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:3:p:526-31
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Benjamin Artz & John S Heywood, 2024. "Performance pay and work hours: US survey evidence," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 609-627.
    2. Hjort, Jonas & Li, Xuan & Sarsons, Heather, 2020. "Across-Country Wage Compression in Multinationals," CEPR Discussion Papers 14465, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 2023. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 179(3-4), pages 470-499.
    4. Jörn‐Steffen Pischke, 2018. "Wage Flexibility and Employment Fluctuations: Evidence from the Housing Sector," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 85(339), pages 407-427, July.
    5. Colin P. Green & John S. Heywood, 2016. "Don't Forget the Gravy! Are Bonuses Just Added on Top of Salaries?," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 490-513, July.
    6. Reizer, Balázs, 2022. "Employment and Wage Consequences of Flexible Wage Components," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    7. Joao Alfredo Galindo da Fonseca & Giovanni Gallipoli & Yaniv Yedid-Levi, 2017. "Match Quality, Contractual Sorting and Wage Cyclicality," Working Papers 2017-076, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    8. Nucci, Francesco & Riggi, Marianna, 2013. "Performance pay and changes in U.S. labor market dynamics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2796-2813.
    9. Matthias Fahn & Takeshi Murooka, 2022. "Informal Incentives and Labor Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 9740, CESifo.
    10. Galindo da Fonseca, João Alfredo & Gallipoli, Giovanni & Yedid-Levi, Yaniv, 2020. "Match quality and contractual sorting," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    11. Ana Abras & Renata Narita, 2016. "Informalidade, Desigualdade E Pagamento Por Performance No Brasil," Anais do XLII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 42nd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 230, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    12. Fahn, Matthias & Murooka, Takeshi, 2024. "Informal Incentives and Labor Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 17042, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Balazs Reizer, 2016. "Do Firms Pay Bonuses to Protect Jobs?," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1612, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    14. Joao Alfredo Galindo da Fonseca & Giovanni Gallipoli & Yaniv Yedid-Levi, 2016. "Revisiting the Relationship Between Unemployment and Wages," Working Papers 2016-001, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    15. Jonas Hjort & Xuan Li & Heather Sarsons, 2020. "Random-Coefficients Logit Demand Estimation with Zero-Valued Market Shares," Working Papers 2020-15, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    16. Colin Green & John Heywood, 2012. "Don't Forget the Gravy! Are Bonuses and Time Rates Complements?," Working Papers 13424023, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.

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