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Employer Size and Dual Labor Markets

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  • Rebitzer, James B
  • Robinson, Michael D

Abstract

Effort regulation models argue that labor markets are segmented because of differences in the technology of supervision across firms. Primary jobs pay above market clearing wages because these jobs are difficult to monitor. Secondary jobs, in contrast, pose no monitoring difficulties and, therefore, pay a market clearing wage. If, as the literature suggests, increases in employer size make supervision more difficult, the authors should observe that wages increase with employer size in primary jobs but not secondary jobs. Copyright 1991 by MIT Press.

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  • Rebitzer, James B & Robinson, Michael D, 1991. "Employer Size and Dual Labor Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(4), pages 710-715, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:73:y:1991:i:4:p:710-15
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    1. Oliver E. Williamson, 1967. "Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75(2), pages 123-123.
    2. Calvo, Guillermo A & Wellisz, Stanislaw, 1978. "Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(5), pages 943-952, October.
    3. repec:fth:prinin:258 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Cain, Glen G, 1976. "The Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories to Orthodox Theory: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 1215-1257, December.
    5. Alan B. Krueger, 1991. "The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the United States," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 44(4), pages 644-660, July.
    6. Dickens, William T & Lang, Kevin, 1988. "Labor Market Segmentation and the Union Wage Premium," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 70(3), pages 527-530, August.
    7. Bulow, Jeremy I & Summers, Lawrence H, 1986. "A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy,Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 376-414, July.
    8. James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 1991. "A Model of Dual Labor Markets When Product Demand Is Uncertain," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1373-1383.
    9. George A. Akerlof, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 97(4), pages 543-569.
    10. Mellow, Wesley, 1982. "Employer Size and Wages," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(3), pages 495-501, August.
    11. Alan Krueger, 1989. "The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the United States," Working Papers 638, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
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    Cited by:

    1. Rudy Fichtenbaum, 2006. "Labour market segmentation and union wage gaps," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 64(3), pages 387-420.
    2. Zenou, Yves & Smith, Tony E., 1995. "Efficiency wages, involuntary unemployment and urban spatial structure," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 547-573, August.
    3. Agell, Jonas & Bennmarker, Helge, 2002. "Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a representative view from the inside," Working Paper Series 2002:12, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    4. Christian Manuel Posso, 2010. "Calidad del empleo y segmentación laboral: un análisis para el mercado laboral colombiano 2001-2006," Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad, Universidad de los Andes,Facultad de Economía, CEDE, February.
    5. José Ignacio Uribe & Carlos Humberto Ortiz & Gustavo Adolfo García, 2007. "La segmentación del mercado laboral colombiano en la década de los noventa," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 9(16), pages 189-221, January-J.
    6. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 1995. "The consequences of minimum wage laws Some new theoretical ideas," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 245-255, February.
    7. Marcel Garz, 2013. "Labour Market Segmentation: Standard and Non-Standard Employment in Germany," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 14(3), pages 349-371, August.
    8. Carlos Humberto Ortiz & José Ignacio Uribe & Érika Raquel Badillo, 2009. "Segmentación inter e intrarregional en el mercado laboral urbano de Colombia, 2001-2006," Revista ESPE - Ensayos sobre Política Económica, Banco de la Republica de Colombia, vol. 27(58), pages 194-231, August.
    9. Christopher Hanes, 2000. "Nominal Wage Rigidity and Industry Characteristics in the Downturns of 1893, 1929, and 1981," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1432-1446, December.
    10. Mengistu Assefa Wendimu & Peter Gibbon, 2014. "Labour markets for irrigated agriculture in central Ethiopia: Wage premiums and segmentation," IFRO Working Paper 2014/06, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    11. Gustavo Gonzalez Palomino, 2014. "Diferencias en los ingresos laborales en Colombia, 2001‐2006: un análisis de descomposición de Oaxaca para los sectores formal e informal," Revista CIFE, Universidad Santo Tomás, September.
    12. Alfonso Sousa‐Poza, 2004. "Is the Swiss Labor Market Segmented? An Analysis Using Alternative Approaches," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 18(1), pages 131-161, March.
    13. Barth, Erling, 1992. "Why Do Some Firms Pay More? An Empirical Investigation of Inter-Firm Wage Differentials," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt7f18t2vt, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
    14. Laura Juarez, 2008. "Are Informal Workers Compensated for the Lack of Fringe Benefits? Free Health Care as an Instrument for Formality," Working Papers 0804, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    15. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2291-2372 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Zafar Mueen Nasir, 1998. "Determinants of Personal Earnings in Pakistan: Findings from the Labour Force Survey 1993-94," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 37(3), pages 251-274.
    17. Albaek, Karsten & Arai, Mahmood & Asplund, Rita & Barth, Erling & Strojer Madsen, Erik, 1998. "Measuring wage effects of plant size," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 425-448, December.
    18. Rebitzer, James B., 1995. "Is there a trade-off between supervision and wages? An empirical test of efficiency wage theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 107-129, September.

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