IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cdl/indrel/qt7f18t2vt.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Why Do Some Firms Pay More? An Empirical Investigation of Inter-Firm Wage Differentials

Author

Listed:
  • Barth, Erling

Abstract

The paper tests implications of efficiency wage theories, agency theories and union bargaining theory on Norwegian micro data. Firm specific means of individual characteristics as well as other firm characteristics are utilized to study the nature of high paying firms vs. lower paying firms. The study finds evidence in favor of all three types of non-market clearing models. Firms do not distinguish between workers with different levels of autonomy or union status in their wage setting. However, firms with a higher average level of employees' autonomy or union density pay better. Human capital effects, on the other hand, originate autonomy or union density pay better. Human capital effects, on the other hand, originate within firms. Wage enhancing mechanisms from each type of theory do not reinforce eachother: higher wages may serve several purposes in any one firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Barth, Erling, 1992. "Why Do Some Firms Pay More? An Empirical Investigation of Inter-Firm Wage Differentials," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt7f18t2vt, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:indrel:qt7f18t2vt
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/7f18t2vt.pdf;origin=repeccitec
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, 1990. "The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(2), pages 255-283.
    3. Rebitzer, James B & Robinson, Michael D, 1991. "Employer Size and Dual Labor Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(4), pages 710-715, November.
    4. Krueger, Alan B & Summers, Lawrence H, 1988. "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-industry Wage Structure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 259-293, March.
    5. Topel, Robert H, 1991. "Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 145-176, February.
    6. Alan B. Krueger & Lawrence H. Summers, 1986. "Reflections on the Inter-Industry Wage Structure," NBER Working Papers 1968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. George A. Akerlof, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 97(4), pages 543-569.
    8. Abraham, Katharine G & Farber, Henry S, 1987. "Job Duration, Seniority, and Earnings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 278-297, June.
    9. Brown, Charles & Medoff, James, 1989. "The Employer Size-Wage Effect," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1027-1059, October.
    10. Barth, Erling & Zweimuller, Josef, 1992. "Labor Market Institutions and the Industry Wage Distribution: Evidence from Austria, Norway, and the U.S," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt1811h146, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
    11. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    12. Alan B. Krueger, 1991. "Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(1), pages 75-101.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2291-2372 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Veronique Genre & Karsten Kohn & Daphne Momferatou, 2011. "Understanding inter-industry wage structures in the euro area," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(11), pages 1299-1313.
    3. Sessions, John G., 2008. "Wages, supervision and sharing," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 653-672, November.
    4. Paul Hek & Daniel Vuuren, 2011. "Are older workers overpaid? A literature review," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(4), pages 436-460, August.
    5. Kertesi, Gábor & Köllő, János, 2003. "Ágazati bérkülönbségek Magyarországon, II. rész. Járadékokon való osztozkodás koncentrált ágazatokban, szakszervezeti aktivitás jelenlétében [Pay differentials between industries in Hungary, II. Re," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1049-1074.
    6. Kertesi, Gábor & Köllő, János, 2003. "Ágazati bérkülönbségek Magyarországon, I. rész. Az ágazati járadékképződés alternatív modelljei [Pay differentials between industries in Hungary. I. The basic models]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 923-938.
    7. Barth, Erling & Zweimuller, Josef, 1992. "Labor Market Institutions and the Industry Wage Distribution: Evidence from Austria, Norway, and the U.S," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt1811h146, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
    8. William T. Dickens & Lawrence F. Katz & Kevin Lang & Lawrence H. Summers, 1987. "Employee Crime, Monitoring, and the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis," NBER Working Papers 2356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Andrew Pendleton & Alex Bryson & Howard Gospel, 2017. "Ownership and Pay in Britain," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 55(4), pages 688-715, December.
    10. David Neumark & Steven A. Sharpe, 1992. "Hostile takeovers and expropriation of extramarginal wages: a test," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 197, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. Jean‐Pierre Danthine & André Kurmann, 2007. "The Macroeconomic Consequences of Reciprocity in Labor Relations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(4), pages 857-881, December.
    12. Vesna Stavrevska, 2011. "The efficiency wages perspective to wage rigidity in the open economy: a survey," International Journal of Manpower, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 32(3), pages 273-299, June.
    13. Katarzyna Budnik, 2012. "Do those who stay work less? On the impact of emigration on the measured TFP in Poland," NBP Working Papers 113, Narodowy Bank Polski.
    14. John Burger & Stephen Walters, 2008. "Testing Fair Wage Theory," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 318-332, December.
      • John D. Burger & Stephen J.K. Walters, 2006. "Testing Fair Wage Theory," Working Papers 0623, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
    15. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
    16. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Max Albert & Jürgen Meckle, 2001. "Efficiency‐Wage Unemployment and Intersectoral Wage Differentials in a Heckscher–Ohlin Model," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 2(3), pages 287-301, August.
    18. Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodossiou, Ioannis, 2012. "Rewarding carrots and crippling sticks: Eliciting employee preferences for the optimal incentive design," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1247-1265.
    19. Flynn, Sean, 2005. "Why only some industries unionize: insights from reciprocity theory," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 99-120, June.
    20. Måns Söderbom & Francis Teal & Anthony Wambugu, 2002. "Does firm size really affect earnings?," CSAE Working Paper Series 2002-08, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    21. Velenchik, Ann D., 1997. "Government intervention, efficiency wages, and the employer size wage effect in Zimbabwe," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 305-338, August.
    22. Kirchler, Erich & Fehr, Ernst & Evans, Robert, 1996. "Social exchange in the labor market: Reciprocity and trust versus egoistic money maximization," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 313-341, June.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cdl:indrel:qt7f18t2vt. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lisa Schiff (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/irucbus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.