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Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods

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  • Momi, Takeshi

    (Dpartment of Economics, Doshisha University)

Abstract

In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.

Suggested Citation

  • Momi, Takeshi, 2017. "Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:1792
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kannai, Yakar, 1970. "Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(6), pages 791-815, November.
    2. , Prabal & , & ,, 2014. "Strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency in quasi-linear exchange economies," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
    3. Takeshi Momi, 2013. "Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb–Douglas preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 787-792, March.
    4. Kazuhiko Hashimoto, 2008. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the Cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(3), pages 457-473, October.
    5. Miki Kato & Shinji Ohseto, 2002. "Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 659-664.
    6. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 73-93, August.
    7. Momi, Takeshi, 2013. "Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1237-1254.
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    Cited by:

    1. Takeshi Momi, 2020. "Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(2), pages 325-367, August.
    2. Alva, Samson & Manjunath, Vikram, 2020. "The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 15-29.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social choice; strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; exchange economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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