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Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb–Douglas preferences

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  • Takeshi Momi

Abstract

We show that in a pure exchange economy with two agents and a finite number of goods, there exists no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and non-dictatorial social choice allocation function on any local Cobb–Douglas preference domain. This is a slight extension of a result proved by Hashimoto ( 2008 ). Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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  • Takeshi Momi, 2013. "Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb–Douglas preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 787-792, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:3:p:787-792
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0643-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Momi, Takeshi, 2013. "Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1237-1254.
    2. Kazuhiko Hashimoto, 2008. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the Cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(3), pages 457-473, October.
    3. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 73-93, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mridu Goswami, 2015. "Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(2), pages 389-422, February.
    2. Momi, Takeshi, 2017. "Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
    3. Takeshi Momi, 2020. "Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in many-agent economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(2), pages 325-367, August.
    4. Cho, Wonki Jo & Thomson, William, 2023. "Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: An impossibility result," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 1012-1017.
    5. Jin Li & Jingyi Xue, 2013. "Egalitarian division under Leontief Preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 597-622, November.
    6. Momi, Takeshi, 2013. "Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1237-1254.

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