IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/houspd/v23y2013i3p521-542.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Servicer and Spatial Heterogeneity of Loss Mitigation Practices in Soft Housing Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Lei Ding

Abstract

Although loan modifications are being widely used as a way to stabilize housing markets by preventing avoidable foreclosures, not much is known about the ways in which specific servicer-related factors affect the likelihood of modifications. Using a large sample of nonprime loans, this study examines recent loan modification practices adopted by different servicers in two types of soft markets, in neighborhoods differently affected by the foreclosure crisis, and among borrowers in different racial and ethnic groups. The results demonstrate striking variations in the incidence of loan modifications by servicers and significant differences between the servicers more likely to modify troubled loans and those who are less likely to do so. Loan modifications are less frequent where they are needed the most: among savable borrowers in the neighborhoods hardest hit by the crisis. This considerable variation in modification practices across servicers and neighborhoods likely reflects both structural obstacles to modifications and the absence of a uniform approach to loss mitigation.

Suggested Citation

  • Lei Ding, 2013. "Servicer and Spatial Heterogeneity of Loss Mitigation Practices in Soft Housing Markets," Housing Policy Debate, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(3), pages 521-542, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:houspd:v:23:y:2013:i:3:p:521-542
    DOI: 10.1080/10511482.2013.782886
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/10511482.2013.782886
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/10511482.2013.782886?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Adelino, Manuel & Gerardi, Kristopher & Willen, Paul S., 2013. "Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults, self-cures and securitization," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(7), pages 835-853.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mikhail Samarin & Madhuri Sharma, 2021. "Rent burden determinants in hot and cold housing markets of Davidson and Shelby counties, Tennessee," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 1608-1632, September.
    2. Stephen L. Ross & Yuan Wang, 2022. "Mortgage Lenders and the Geographic Concentration of Foreclosures," Working Papers 2022-001, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    3. Lei Ding, 2016. "Borrower Credit Access And Credit Performance After Loan Modifications," Working Papers 16-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    4. Lei Ding, 2017. "Borrower credit access and credit performance after loan modifications," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 977-1005, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kyle Herkenhoff & Lee Ohanian, 2019. "The Impact of Foreclosure Delay on U.S. Employment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 31, pages 63-83, January.
    2. Kristopher Gerardi & Lauren Lambie-Hanson & Paul S. Willen, 2022. "Lessons Learned from Mortgage Borrower Policies and Outcomes during the COVID-19 Pandemic," Policy Hub, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 2022(9), July.
    3. David Downs & Pisun (Tracy) Xu, 2015. "Commercial Real Estate, Distress and Financial Resolution: Portfolio Lending Versus Securitization," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 254-287, August.
    4. Pagès, Henri, 2013. "Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 30-54.
    5. Natalia Kovrijnykh & Igor Livshits, 2017. "Screening As A Unified Theory Of Delinquency, Renegotiation, And Bankruptcy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 499-527, May.
    6. Steve Holden & Austin Kelly & Douglas McManus & Therese Scharlemann & Ryan Singer & John D. Worth, 2012. "The HAMP NPV Model: Development and Early Performance," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 40, pages 32-64, December.
    7. Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, 2011. "Securitization and moral hazard: evidence from credit score cutoff rules," Public Policy Discussion Paper 11-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    8. Francesco D’Acunto & Daniel Hoang & Michael Weber, 2022. "Managing Households’ Expectations with Unconventional Policies," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(4), pages 1597-1642.
    9. Agarwal, Sumit & Amromin, Gene & Ben-David, Itzhak & Chomsisengphet, Souphala & Evanoff, Douglas D., 2011. "The role of securitization in mortgage renegotiation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 559-578.
    10. Wenli Li & Ishani Tewari & Michelle J. White, 2014. "Using bankruptcy to reduce foreclosures: does strip-down of mortgages affect the supply of mortgage credit?," Working Papers 14-35, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    11. Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit & Vig, Vikrant, 2010. "Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 369-397, September.
    12. Hanming Fang & You Suk Kim & Wenli Li, 2015. "The Dynamics of Adjustable-Rate Subprime Mortgage Default: A Structural Estimation," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-114, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    13. J. Carter Braxton & Gordon Phillips & Kyle Herkenhoff, 2018. "Can the Unemployed Borrow? Implications for Public Insurance," 2018 Meeting Papers 564, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Barney Hartman-Glaser, 2016. "Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2016-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    15. Dan Immergluck, 2011. "The Local Wreckage of Global Capital: The Subprime Crisis, Federal Policy and High‐Foreclosure Neighborhoods in the US," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 130-146, January.
    16. McCann, Fergal, 2017. "Resolving a Non-Performing Loan crisis: The ongoing case of the Irish mortgage market," Research Technical Papers 10/RT/17, Central Bank of Ireland.
    17. Gerardo Pérez‐Cavazos, 2019. "Consequences of Debt Forgiveness: Strategic Default Contagion and Lender Learning," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 797-841, June.
    18. Stuart Gabriel & Matteo Iacoviello & Chandler Lutz, 2021. "A Crisis of Missed Opportunities? Foreclosure Costs and Mortgage Modification During the Great Recession [Synthetic control methods for comparative case studies: Estimating the effect of California," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(2), pages 864-906.
    19. W. Scott Frame, 2018. "Agency Conflicts In Residential Mortgage Securitization: What Does The Empirical Literature Tell Us?," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 41(2), pages 237-251, June.
    20. Giovanni Favara & Mariassunta Giannetti, 2017. "Forced Asset Sales and the Concentration of Outstanding Debt: Evidence from the Mortgage Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(3), pages 1081-1118, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:houspd:v:23:y:2013:i:3:p:521-542. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RHPD20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.