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The growth in military expenditure in Germany 1951--2011: did parties matter?

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  • Björn Kauder
  • Niklas Potrafke

Abstract

We examine whether government ideology was correlated with the growth in military expenditure in Germany over the period 1951--2011. Using various measures of government ideology, the results do not show any effect. The exception is an ideology measure based on the Comparative Manifesto Project (left-right scale): using this measure, the results show that the growth in military expenditure increased by about 2.4 percentage points, when the ideology variable (right-wing) increased by one standard deviation. This effect, however, is based on observations until the early 1960s and cannot be generalized. The major political parties agreed on how to evaluate international risks and threats. Government ideology retired to the background. We conjecture that the consensus among the major parties will persist -- even if military spending needs to be increased in response to new international risks and threats.

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  • Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke, 2016. "The growth in military expenditure in Germany 1951--2011: did parties matter?," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(4), pages 503-519, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:27:y:2016:i:4:p:503-519
    DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2015.1050276
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    1. Alberto Alesina, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(3), pages 651-678.
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    Cited by:

    1. Niklas Potrafke, 2018. "Government ideology and economic policy-making in the United States—a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 145-207, January.
    2. Potrafke, Niklas, 2020. "Dragnet-Controls and Government Ideology," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 31(5), pages 485-501.
    3. Bove, Vincenzo & Efthyvoulou, Georgios & Navas, Antonio, 2017. "Political cycles in public expenditure: butter vs guns," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 582-604.
    4. Langlotz, Sarah & Potrafke, Niklas, 2019. "Does development aid increase military expenditure?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 735-757.
    5. Manuela Krause & Niklas Potrafke, 2020. "The Real Estate Transfer Tax and Government Ideology: Evidence from the German States," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 76(1), pages 100-120.
    6. Klomp, Jeroen, 2023. "Defending election victory by attacking company revenues: The impact of elections on the international defense industry," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    7. Saba Charles Shaaba & Ngepah Nicholas, 2020. "Military expenditure and security outcome convergence in African regional economic communities: evidence from the convergence club algorithm," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 26(1), pages 1-28, February.
    8. Johannes Blum & Niklas Potrafke, 2019. "Internationale Abkommen und Regierungswechsel: Evidenz zum NATO-Zwei-Prozent-Ziel," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 72(03), pages 18-21, February.
    9. Oliver Pamp & Florian Dendorfer & Paul W. Thurner, 2018. "Arm your friends and save on defense? The impact of arms exports on military expenditures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 165-187, October.
    10. Christos Kollias & Suzanna Maria Paleologou & Panayiotis Tzeremes & Nickolaos Tzeremes, 2018. "The demand for military spending in Latin American countries," Latin American Economic Review, Springer;Centro de Investigaciòn y Docencia Económica (CIDE), vol. 27(1), pages 1-17, December.
    11. Johannes Blum & Niklas Potrafke, 2020. "Does a Change of Government Influence Compliance with International Agreements? Empirical Evidence for the NATO Two Percent Target," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(7), pages 743-761, October.
    12. Buts Caroline & Bois Cind Du & Raes Steffi, 2017. "Political Cycles in Military Deployment," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 23(4), pages 1-7, December.
    13. Jens Boysen-Hogrefe & Wolfgang Scherf & Carolin Dresselhaus & Thomas Schäfer & Kunka Petkova & Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Reiner Holznagel & Jens Lemmer & Manuela Krause & Niklas Potrafke & Alfons Weic, 2017. "Stagnierende Wohneigentumsquote, Share Deals: Wie sollte die Grunderwerbsteuer reformiert werden?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 70(21), pages 03-24, November.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General

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