IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/ubwwpe/19994.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Die EWWU als Club: Positive und normative Implikationen für den Beitritt mittel- und osteuropäischer Reformstaaten

Author

Listed:
  • Sell, Friedrich L.

Abstract

Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Frage nach der Wahl eines optimalen Wechselkursregimes für ausgewählte Transformationsländer (Tschechische Republik, Ungarn, Estland, Slowenien und Polen), die an einer baldigen Aufnahme in die EWWU interessiert sind. Der gewählte Analyseansatz greift auf positive und normative Hinweise der Club Theorie zurück. Es wird zunächst gezeigt, wie sich die optimale Größe (Anzahl der Mitglieder) und die optimale Bereitstellung des Clubgutes (Inflationsrate) einer Währungsunion simultan bestimmen lassen. Gleichfalls wird die Anreizstruktur für bisherige Mitglieder, neue aufzunehmen und für Aufnahmekandidaten, der Währungsunion beizutreten, dargestellt. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden Kriterien (Kosten und Nutzen des Beitritts) für eine bestmögliche Strategie der Wechselkurspolitik der Beitrittskandidaten zur Vorbereitung auf den EURO entwickelt. Der am Ende erarbeitete Vorschlag läuft darauf hinaus, das Konzept von der Schlange im Tunnel neu zu beleben, wobei die Reformstaaten enge Bandbreiten ihrer Wechselkurse untereinander und vergleichsweise weite gegenüber dem EURO wählen sollten.

Suggested Citation

  • Sell, Friedrich L., 1999. "Die EWWU als Club: Positive und normative Implikationen für den Beitritt mittel- und osteuropäischer Reformstaaten," Working Papers in Economics 1999,4, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ubwwpe:19994
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32820/1/303221216.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sinn, Hans-Werner & Feist, Holger, 1997. "Eurowinners and Eurolosers: The distribution of seigniorage wealth in EMU1," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 665-689, December.
    2. Hibbs, Douglas A., 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1467-1487, December.
    3. Roland Vaubel, 1976. "Real exchange-rate changes in the European community: The empirical evidence and its implications for European currency unification," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 112(3), pages 429-470, September.
    4. Hayo, Bernd, 1998. "Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 241-263, May.
    5. Sieg, Gernot, 1997. "A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 503-516, September.
    6. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John T, 1980. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1481-1521, December.
    7. Alberto Alesina, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(3), pages 651-678.
    8. Francesco Lippi, 1999. "Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1615.
    9. Sorenson, John R. & Tschirhart, John T. & Whinston, Andrew B., 1978. "Private good clubs and the core," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 77-95, August.
    10. Goodhart, Charles A. E., 1998. "The two concepts of money: implications for the analysis of optimal currency areas," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 407-432, August.
    11. George S. Tavlas, 1993. "The ‘New’ Theory of Optimum Currency Areas," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(6), pages 663-685, November.
    12. Lukas Menkhoff & Friedrich Sell, 1991. "The advantages of a small European Monetary Union," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 26(2), pages 64-67, March.
    13. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
    14. Friedrich L. Sell, 1996. "On the theoretical determination of optimal currency areas in the framework of club theory," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 126-143, Autumn.
    15. Vaubel, Roland, 1999. "The Future of the Euro : A Public Choice Perspective," Discussion Papers 570, Institut fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Abteilung fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre.
    16. Paul Grauwe, 1975. "Conditions for monetary integration — A geometric interpretation," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 111(4), pages 634-646, December.
    17. Chappell, Henry W, Jr & Keech, William R, 1986. "Party Differences in Macroeconomic Policies and Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 71-74, May.
    18. Fuhrmann Wilfried, 1999. "Zur Theorie des Currency Boards," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 48(1), pages 85-104, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sell, Friedrich L., 2007. "More about economic and non-economic determinants of (mutual) trust and trustworthiness," Working Papers in Economics 2007,2, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    2. Jochem, Axel, 1999. "Währungspolitische Interdependenz der EU-Beitrittskandidaten und die Wahl eines geeigneten Wechselkurssystems," Working Papers in Economics 1999,5, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01291401, HAL.
    2. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 235-259, January.
    3. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Post-Print hal-01291401, HAL.
    4. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
    5. Berger, Helge & Woitek, Ulrich, 1997. "How opportunistic are partisan German central bankers: Evidence on the Vaubel hypothesis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 807-821, December.
    6. Helge Berger & Ulrich Woitek, "undated". "Does Conservatism Matter? A Time Series Approach to Central Banking," Working Papers 9814, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised May 1999.
    7. Maier, Philipp & Bezoen, Saskia, 2004. "Bashing and supporting central banks: the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 923-939, November.
    8. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    9. Dodge Cahan & Luisa Doerr & Niklas Potrafke, 2019. "Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 215-238, December.
    10. Beckmann, Joscha & Ademmer, Esther & Belke, Ansgar & Schweickert, Rainer, 2017. "The political economy of the impossible trinity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 103-123.
    11. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "To Be or not to Be a Euro Country? The Behavioural Political Economics of Currency Unions," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1883, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    12. repec:zbw:rwirep:0094 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
    14. Göhlmann, Silja & Vaubel, Roland, 2005. "The Educational and Professional Background of Central Bankers and its Effect on Inflation - An Empirical Analysis," RWI Discussion Papers 25, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
    15. Oriola, Hugo, 2023. "Political monetary cycles: An empirical study," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    16. Belke, Ansgar, 2000. "Partisan Political Business Cycles in the German Labour Market? Empirical Tests in the Light of the Lucas-Critique," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(3-4), pages 225-283, September.
    17. Niklas Potrafke, 2012. "Zum Einfluss von Regierungsideologie und Zentralbankunabhängigkeit auf die Geldpolitik," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 65(11), pages 25-26, June.
    18. Aidt, Toke S. & Mooney, Graham, 2014. "Voting suffrage and the political budget cycle: Evidence from the London Metropolitan Boroughs 1902–1937," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 53-71.
    19. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    20. Hoda Aboushanab & Klaus Gründler & Niklas Potrafke & Fabian Ruthardt & Jannik Sielmann, 2020. "Ökonomenpanel: Hoffnungsträger Biden," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 73(12), pages 40-43, December.
    21. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Club-Theorie; EWWU; Transformationsländer; Wechselkurspolitik; Kosten- und Nutzenanalyse; Club Theory; EMU; Economies in Transition; Exchange Rate Policy; Cost and Benefit Analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • P43 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Finance; Public Finance
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ubwwpe:19994. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ivbwmde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.