Faculty evaluation as a social dilemma: a game theoretic approach

This paper considers issues pertaining to accounting faculty performance evaluation as it is generally applied in the United States. How performance is evaluated is a question of interest to all stakeholders in the enterprise of accounting education, particularly in the light of recent changes in the educational environment. Some characteristics of faculty performance evaluation are institutionspecific. For example, the number of years of service required before a tenure decision can vary across universities, and the level of formality in the evaluation process is not uniform. Furthermore, some business schools do not use the separate academic department structure. Regardless of these differences, evaluation is typically a function of the faculty member's research, teaching, and service contributions, and precise expectations are rarely fully specified, leaving open the question of just how any particular contributions are evaluated. We use game theory to create a model of faculty efforts and outcomes within a social dilemma; and we develop interdependent social dilemmas, two social dilemmas played simultaneously. Within accounting academia, these two dilemmas represent the resource allocation among departments within a business school, and the payoff scenarios facing individual faculty within an accounting department. The interdependence arises because the payoffs available in each dilemma simultaneously depend on the outcome of the other. Our model highlights the dependence of group performance and resulting resource availability on the distribution of faculty efforts toward the attainment of personal and collective goals. The results indicate the possibility of increasing the resources available to all by recognizing a broader definition of faculty contribution. Placing faculty evaluation within the social dilemma context can improve both departmental and individual outcomes by encouraging both collective and individual efforts.