IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/waterr/v31y2017i9d10.1007_s11269-017-1602-0.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Multiobjective Optimization of Pressure Dependent Dynamic Design for Water Distribution Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Akbar Shirzad

    (Urmia University of Technology)

  • Massoud Tabesh

    (School of Civil Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Tehran)

  • Behzad Atayikia

    (University of Tehran)

Abstract

Optimal design and rehabilitation scheduling of water distribution networks (WDNs) have been often dealt separately over the past few decades. However initial design (which is named as static design in this paper) has indubitable influence on the operational condition and rehabilitation scheduling of network. This paper introduces an approach for simultaneous optimization of initial design and rehabilitation scheduling of WDNs during their life cycle. In this approach which is named as dynamic design, pipe diameters in the first year and their rehabilitation/replacement in the next years of the expected life of the network are determined considering the nodal demands growth and increase in pipes’ roughness. The proposed model consists of a multiobjective ant colony optimization engine linked to a pressure dependent analysis model and a pipe break prediction model. This paper introduces the following contributions: (1) it implements dynamic design based on the pressure dependent analysis with considering leakage; (2) a support vector machine based sub model is used for pipe break prediction. Then pipe breaks and their repair costs are considered in dynamic design process; (3) a new reliability index is used as one of the objective functions. Two networks are used to investigate the impact of static and dynamic designs on the reliability and total cost of design and rehabilitation of WDNs during their life cycle. The results show that the dynamic design produces more reliable and lower cost networks in comparison to the ones resulted from either static design or rehabilitation scheduling separately.

Suggested Citation

  • Akbar Shirzad & Massoud Tabesh & Behzad Atayikia, 2017. "Multiobjective Optimization of Pressure Dependent Dynamic Design for Water Distribution Networks," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 31(9), pages 2561-2578, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:waterr:v:31:y:2017:i:9:d:10.1007_s11269-017-1602-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s11269-017-1602-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11269-017-1602-0
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11269-017-1602-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Salah Saleh & Tiku T. Tanyimboh, 2016. "Multi-Directional Maximum-Entropy Approach to the Evolutionary Design Optimization of Water Distribution Systems," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(6), pages 1885-1901, April.
    2. Calvin Siew & Tiku Tanyimboh & Alemtsehay Seyoum, 2014. "Assessment of Penalty-Free Multi-Objective Evolutionary Optimization Approach for the Design and Rehabilitation of Water Distribution Systems," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 28(2), pages 373-389, January.
    3. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    5. Feifei Zheng & Zhexian Qi & Weiwei Bi & Tuqiao Zhang & Tingchao Yu & Yu Shao, 2017. "Improved Understanding on the Searching Behavior of NSGA-II Operators Using Run-Time Measure Metrics with Application to Water Distribution System Design Problems," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 31(4), pages 1121-1138, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tornyeviadzi, Hoese Michel & Owusu-Ansah, Emmanuel & Mohammed, Hadi & Seidu, Razak, 2022. "A systematic framework for dynamic nodal vulnerability assessment of water distribution networks based on multilayer networks," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 219(C).
    2. Ngandu Balekelayi & Haile Woldesellasse & Solomon Tesfamariam, 2022. "Comparison of the Performance of a Surrogate Based Gaussian Process, NSGA2 and PSO Multi-objective Optimization of the Operation and Fuzzy Structural Reliability of Water Distribution System: Case Stu," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 36(15), pages 6169-6185, December.
    3. Soheila Beygi & Massoud Tabesh & Shuming Liu, 2019. "Multi-Objective Optimization Model for Design and Operation of Water Transmission Systems Using a Power Resilience Index for Assessing Hydraulic Reliability," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 33(10), pages 3433-3447, August.
    4. Yihong Guan & Yangyang Chu & Mou Lv & Shuyan Li & Hang Li & Shen Dong & Yanbo Su, 2023. "Application of Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm II in Multi-Objective Water Supply Optimization Model Design for Mountainous Complex Terrain," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(15), pages 1-20, August.
    5. Yaser Amiri-Ardakani & Mohammad Najafzadeh, 2021. "Pipe Break Rate Assessment While Considering Physical and Operational Factors: A Methodology based on Global Positioning System and Data-Driven Techniques," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 35(11), pages 3703-3720, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hwang, Sung-Ha & Rey-Bellet, Luc, 2021. "Positive feedback in coordination games: Stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 355-373.
    2. Alemtsehay G. Seyoum & Tiku T. Tanyimboh, 2016. "Investigation into the Pressure-Driven Extension of the EPANET Hydraulic Simulation Model for Water Distribution Systems," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(14), pages 5351-5367, November.
    3. In-Koo Cho & Akihiko Matsui, 2012. "A Dynamic Foundation of the Rawlsian Maxmin Criterion," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 51-70, March.
    4. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Individual learning and social rationality1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 651-663, May.
    5. In, Younghwan, 2014. "Fictitious play property of the Nash demand game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 408-412.
    6. Rozen, Kareen, 2008. "Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining," Working Papers 39, Yale University, Department of Economics.
    7. Giovanni Ponti & Robert M. Seymour, 1999. "Evolutionary Stability Of Inequality Structures," Rationality and Society, , vol. 11(1), pages 47-77, February.
    8. Sawa, Ryoji, 2021. "A prospect theory Nash bargaining solution and its stochastic stability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 692-711.
    9. Tiku T. Tanyimboh & Anna M. Czajkowska, 2021. "Entropy maximizing evolutionary design optimization of water distribution networks under multiple operating conditions," Environment Systems and Decisions, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 267-285, June.
    10. Cailin O'Connor, 2019. "Methods, Models, and the Evolution of Moral Psychology," Papers 1909.09198, arXiv.org.
    11. Hwang, Sung-Ha & Lim, Wooyoung & Neary, Philip & Newton, Jonathan, 2018. "Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 273-294.
    12. Saez-Marti, Maria & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1999. "Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 268-279, June.
    13. Widgren, Mika & Napel, Stefan, 2003. "EU Conciliation Committee: Council 56 versus Parliament 6," CEPR Discussion Papers 4071, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2003. "Bargaining and Distribution of Power in the EU's Conciliation Committee," CESifo Working Paper Series 1029, CESifo.
    15. Khan, Abhimanyu, 2018. "Expected Utility Preferences versus Prospect Theory Preferences in Bargaining," MPRA Paper 89375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Tiku T. Tanyimboh & Anna Czajkowska, 2018. "Self-Adaptive Solution-Space Reduction Algorithm for Multi-Objective Evolutionary Design Optimization of Water Distribution Networks," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 32(10), pages 3337-3352, August.
    17. Calvin Cochran & Cailin O’Connor, 2019. "Inequality and inequity in the emergence of conventions," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 18(3), pages 264-281, August.
    18. Herbert Dawid & Joern Dermietzel, 2006. "How Robust is the Equal Split Norm? Responsive Strategies, Selection Mechanisms and the Need for Economic Interpretation of Simulation Parameters," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(4), pages 371-397, November.
    19. David J Poza & José I Santos & José M Galán & Adolfo López-Paredes, 2011. "Mesoscopic Effects in an Agent-Based Bargaining Model in Regular Lattices," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(3), pages 1-11, March.
    20. Andersson, Ola & Argenton, Cédric & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2018. "Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 1-5.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:waterr:v:31:y:2017:i:9:d:10.1007_s11269-017-1602-0. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.