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How Robust is the Equal Split Norm? Responsive Strategies, Selection Mechanisms and the Need for Economic Interpretation of Simulation Parameters

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  • Herbert Dawid
  • Joern Dermietzel

Abstract

In this paper the evolution of bargaining behavior is studied under the assumption that individuals might choose between obstinate and responsive strategies. Following Ellingson (1997) it is assumed that obstinate agents commit to a certain demand, whereas responsive agents adapt optimally to their opponents strategy. Agents change strategies due to imitation based on observations of the success of other individuals. An agent-based model, where the updating of the population profile is governed by tournament selection and mutation, is used to describe the evolution of behavior. In contrast to existing local and stochastic stability results, which predict robust convergence to an equal split norm in this and related frameworks, the simulations show persistent episodes of substantial deviation of behavior from the equal split. Furthermore, it is shown that parameters governing frequency and type of updating as well as selection pressure have significant impact on the qualitative features of the simulation results. This shows the importance of being able to attach economic interpretations to changes in these parameter values. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Herbert Dawid & Joern Dermietzel, 2006. "How Robust is the Equal Split Norm? Responsive Strategies, Selection Mechanisms and the Need for Economic Interpretation of Simulation Parameters," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(4), pages 371-397, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:compec:v:28:y:2006:i:4:p:371-397
    DOI: 10.1007/s10614-006-9040-8
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    1. Ludo Waltman & Nees Eck & Rommert Dekker & Uzay Kaymak, 2011. "Economic modeling using evolutionary algorithms: the effect of a binary encoding of strategies," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 21(5), pages 737-756, December.
    2. Alexander Max Bauer & Frauke Meyer & Jan Romann & Mark Siebel & Stefan Traub, 2022. "Need, equity, and accountability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(4), pages 769-814, November.
    3. Yoshio Kamijo, 2023. "Fixation of inequality and emergence of the equal split norm: Approach from behavioral bargaining theory," Working Papers 2209, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, revised Jun 2023.
    4. Dawid, Herbert, 2007. "Evolutionary game dynamics and the analysis of agent-based imitation models: The long run, the medium run and the importance of global analysis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 2108-2133, June.

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