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Mesoscopic Effects in an Agent-Based Bargaining Model in Regular Lattices

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  • David J Poza
  • José I Santos
  • José M Galán
  • Adolfo López-Paredes

Abstract

The effect of spatial structure has been proved very relevant in repeated games. In this work we propose an agent based model where a fixed finite population of tagged agents play iteratively the Nash demand game in a regular lattice. The model extends the multiagent bargaining model by Axtell, Epstein and Young [1] modifying the assumption of global interaction. Each agent is endowed with a memory and plays the best reply against the opponent's most frequent demand. We focus our analysis on the transient dynamics of the system, studying by computer simulation the set of states in which the system spends a considerable fraction of the time. The results show that all the possible persistent regimes in the global interaction model can also be observed in this spatial version. We also find that the mesoscopic properties of the interaction networks that the spatial distribution induces in the model have a significant impact on the diffusion of strategies, and can lead to new persistent regimes different from those found in previous research. In particular, community structure in the intratype interaction networks may cause that communities reach different persistent regimes as a consequence of the hindering diffusion effect of fluctuating agents at their borders.

Suggested Citation

  • David J Poza & José I Santos & José M Galán & Adolfo López-Paredes, 2011. "Mesoscopic Effects in an Agent-Based Bargaining Model in Regular Lattices," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(3), pages 1-11, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0017661
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0017661
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521555838 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
    3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    4. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80.
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    1. Su, Lichen & Yang, Zhengzhi & Zhou, Bowen & Zhang, Naitian & Li, Yumeng, 2023. "Effects of interdependent network reciprocity on the evolution of public cooperation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 454(C).

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