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Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model

Author

Listed:
  • Weibull, Jörgen W.

    (The Research Institute of Industrial Economics)

  • Saez-Marti, Maria

    (Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do. We investigate this possibility in the context of Young's (1993b)bargaining model. It turns out that "cleverness" in this respect indeed does have an advantage in some cases. However, if all individuals are equally informed about past play, in a statistical sense, then the Nash bargaining solution remains the unique long-run outcome when the mutation rate goes to zero.

Suggested Citation

  • Weibull, Jörgen W. & Saez-Marti, Maria, 1998. "Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model," Working Paper Series 507, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0507
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    3. Tore Ellingsen, 1997. "The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 581-602.
    4. Hurkens Sjaak, 1995. "Learning by Forgetful Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 304-329, November.
    5. Stahl Dale O., 1993. "Evolution of Smartn Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 604-617, October.
    6. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
    7. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Matros, Alexander, 2003. "Clever agents in adaptive learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 110-124, July.
    2. Blume, Andreas & Arnold, Tone, 2004. "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 240-259, February.
    3. Abhimanyu Khan & Ronald Peeters, 2014. "Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 903-924, November.
    4. Josephson, Jens, 2009. "Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1543-1554, August.
    5. Matros, Alexander, 2012. "Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a Public Good game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 642-656.
    6. Nax, Heinrich H., 2015. "Equity dynamics in bargaining without information exchange," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65426, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Rozen, Kareen, 2013. "Conflict leads to cooperation in demand bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 35-42.
    8. Herbert Dawid & Joern Dermietzel, 2006. "How Robust is the Equal Split Norm? Responsive Strategies, Selection Mechanisms and the Need for Economic Interpretation of Simulation Parameters," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(4), pages 371-397, November.
    9. Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack, 2002. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 28-53, April.
    10. Wallace, Chris & Young, H. Peyton, 2015. "Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    11. William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(1), pages 107-116.
    12. Kevin Hasker, 2014. "The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000954, David K. Levine.
    13. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 1269, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    14. Sawa, Ryoji, 2019. "Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 633-650.
    15. Alexander Matros, 2006. "Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game," Working Paper 309, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Sep 2008.
    16. Heinrich Nax, 2015. "Equity dynamics in bargaining without information exchange," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 25(5), pages 1011-1026, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolution; Bargaining; Bounded rationality; Game theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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