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Non-dictatorial public distribution rules

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  • Mridu Prabal Goswami

    (Socio-Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute)

Abstract

This paper considers an exchange economy with no individual endowment where agents have classical quasi-linear preferences and the total available resources are to be distributed amongst a set of agents according to their reported preferences over the resources. We show that there is no social choice function (SCF) that is compatible with equal treatment of the equals, strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency. As a consequence, we explore an alternative notion of efficiency, the “Pareto-efficient in the range,” and observe that fairness and strategy-proofness are consistent with this notion of efficiency. A characterization of such SCFs for economies with two goods and two agents is established.

Suggested Citation

  • Mridu Prabal Goswami, 2022. "Non-dictatorial public distribution rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(2), pages 165-183, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:26:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10058-021-00262-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00262-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John Weymark, 2011. "A unified approach to strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 529-550, December.
    2. Mridu Goswami, 2015. "Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(2), pages 389-422, February.
    3. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
    4. , Prabal & , & ,, 2014. "Strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency in quasi-linear exchange economies," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategy-proofness; Pareto-efficiency; Pareto-efficiency in the range; Equal treatment of the equals; Quasi-linear preferences; Public distribution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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