IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sochwe/v44y2015i1p133-149.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives

Author

Listed:
  • Shin Sato

Abstract

A social welfare function satisfies Bounded Response if the smallest change in the variable (i.e., preference profile) leads to the smallest change, if any, in the value (i.e., social preference). We show that each social welfare function on each connected domain satisfies Bounded Response and a nonmanipulability condition if and only if it satisfies a monotonicity condition and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Moreover, under Bounded Response, we show the equivalence of various notions of nonmanipulability of social welfare functions. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Shin Sato, 2015. "Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 133-149, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:44:y:2015:i:1:p:133-149
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0825-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-014-0825-8
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00355-014-0825-8?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sato, Shin, 2013. "A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 259-278.
    2. Nick Baigent, 1987. "Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(1), pages 161-169.
    3. Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
    4. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    5. Blair, Douglas & Muller, Eitan, 1983. "Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 34-53, June.
    6. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    7. Bossert, Walter & Sprumont, Yves, 2014. "Strategy-proof preference aggregation: Possibilities and characterizations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 109-126.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé & M. Remzi Sanver, 2020. "Metrizable preferences over preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(1), pages 177-191, June.
    2. Stefano Vannucci, 2022. "Agenda manipulation-proofness, stalemates, and redundant elicitation in preference aggregation. Exposing the bright side of Arrow's theorem," Papers 2210.03200, arXiv.org.
    3. Ernesto Savaglio & Stefano Vannucci, 2021. "Strategy-Proof Aggregation Rules in Median Semilattices with Applications to Preference Aggregation," Department of Economics University of Siena 867, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    4. Nozomu Muto & Shin Sato, 2016. "A decomposition of strategy-proofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 277-294, August.
    5. Athanasoglou, Stergios, 2016. "Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 156-167.
    6. Muto, Nozomu & Sato, Shin, 2016. "Bounded response of aggregated preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 1-15.
    7. Stergios, Athanasoglou, 2017. "An investigation of weak-veto rules in preference aggregation," Working Papers 363, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 18 Feb 2017.
    8. Ernesto Savaglio & Stefano Vannucci, 2022. "Strategy-proof aggregation rules in median semilattices with applications to preference aggregation," Papers 2208.12732, arXiv.org.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Burak Can & Peter Csoka & Emre Ergin, 2017. "How to choose a non-manipulable delegation?," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1713, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    2. Csóka, Péter & Kondor, Gábor, 2019. "Delegációk igazságos kiválasztása társadalmi választások elméletével [Choosing a fair delegation by social choice theory]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 771-787.
    3. Susumu Cato, 2022. "Stable preference aggregation with infinite population," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(2), pages 287-304, August.
    4. Burak Can & Péter Csóka & Emre Ergin, 2021. "How to choose a fair delegation?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(4), pages 1339-1373, November.
    5. Can, Burak & Csóka, Péter & Ergin, Emre, 2017. "How to choose a delegation for a peace conference?," Research Memorandum 008, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    6. Roy, Souvik & Storcken, Ton, 2019. "A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 46-55.
    7. Nozomu Muto & Shin Sato, 2016. "A decomposition of strategy-proofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 277-294, August.
    8. Shin Sato, 2012. "On strategy-proof social choice under categorization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 455-471, March.
    9. Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia, 2018. "On random social choice functions with the tops-only property," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 413-435.
    10. Mishra, Debasis, 2016. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 925-954.
    11. Erdamar, Bora & Sanver, M. Remzi & Sato, Shin, 2017. "Evaluationwise strategy-proofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 227-238.
    12. Pycia, Marek & Ünver, M. Utku, 2015. "Decomposing random mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 21-33.
    13. Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia, 2023. "A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 228-269.
    14. Haeringer, Guillaume & Hałaburda, Hanna, 2016. "Monotone strategyproofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 68-77.
    15. Shurojit Chatterji & Huaxia Zeng, 2023. "Decomposability and Strategy-proofness in Multidimensional Models," Papers 2303.10889, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    16. Davide Grossi, 2021. "Lecture Notes on Voting Theory," Papers 2105.00216, arXiv.org.
    17. Chatterji, Shurojit & Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup & Sen, Arunava & Zeng, Huaxia, 2022. "Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    18. Liu, Peng, 2020. "Local vs. global strategy-proofness: A new equivalence result for ordinal mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    19. Debasis Mishra, 2014. "A Foundation for dominant strategy voting mechanisms," Discussion Papers 14-09, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
    20. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2016. "Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 168-177.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    D71;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:44:y:2015:i:1:p:133-149. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.