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The Borda class

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  • Terzopoulou, Zoi
  • Endriss, Ulle

Abstract

The Borda rule, originally defined on profiles of individual preferences modelled as linear orders over the set of alternatives, is one of the most important voting rules. But voting rules often need to be used on preferences of a different format as well, such as top-truncated orders, where agents rank just their most preferred alternatives. What is the right generalisation of the Borda rule to such richer models of preference? Several suggestions have been made in the literature, typically considering specific contexts where the rule is to be applied. In this work, taking an axiomatic perspective, we conduct a principled analysis of the different options for defining the Borda rule on top-truncated preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Terzopoulou, Zoi & Endriss, Ulle, 2021. "The Borda class," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 31-40.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:92:y:2021:i:c:p:31-40
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.11.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Franz Dietrich, 2014. "Scoring rules for judgment aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(4), pages 873-911, April.
    2. Hansson, Bengt & Sahlquist, Henrik, 1976. "A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 193-200, October.
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    4. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521731607, September.
    5. Conal Duddy & Ashley Piggins & William Zwicker, 2016. "Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 301-333, February.
    6. Farkas, Daniel & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1979. "The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1305-1306, September.
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    8. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-1041, November.
    9. Florian Brandl & Dominik Peters, 2019. "An axiomatic characterization of the Borda mean rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(4), pages 685-707, April.
    10. Shmuel Nitzan & Ariel Rubinstein, 1981. "A further characterization of Borda ranking method," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 153-158, January.
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    12. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00978027 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Saari,Donald G., 2008. "Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521516051, September.
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    Cited by:

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