Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0159-2
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- Murat Atlamaz & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 598.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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Citations
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- James Schummer & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2013. "Assignment of Arrival Slots," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 164-185, May.
- Klaus, Bettina & Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2006.
"Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 106-110, October.
- Dimitrov, D. & Haake, C.J. & Klaus, B.E., 2005. "Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods," Research Memorandum 028, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Klaus, B.E. & Dimitrov, D. & Haake, C.J., 2005. "Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods," Research Memorandum 060, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- S. Akin & Brennan Platt & Murat Sertel, 2011. "The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(2), pages 147-162, June.
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- Luis Corchón & Matteo Triossi, 2008. "Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent," Documentos de Trabajo 255, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Nanyang Bu & Siwei Chen & William Thomson, 2014. "Merging and splitting endowments in object assignment problems," RCER Working Papers 587, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Somdeb Lahiri, 2005. "Manipulation via Endowments in a Market with Profit Maximizing Agents," Game Theory and Information 0511008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Doruk İriş & İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2011. "Manilulation via endowments in university-admission problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 2952-2958.
- Vikram Manjunath & Alexander Westkamp, 2025. "Marginal Mechanisms For Balanced Exchange," Papers 2502.06499, arXiv.org.
- Thomson, William, 2024. "On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 91-104.
- William Thomson, 2009. "Borrowing-proofness," RCER Working Papers 545, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Di Feng, 2023. "Endowments-swapping-proofness and Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets," Discussion Paper Series DP2023-14, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- Lahiri, Somdeb, 2008.
"Manipulation of market equilibrium via endowments,"
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10002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lahiri, Somdeb, 2008. "Manipulation of market equilibrium via endowments," MPRA Paper 10026, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Altuntaş, Açelya & Phan, William & Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 156-181.
- William Thomson, 2024. "Allocation rules are very generally vulnerable to the strategic withholding of endowments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(3), pages 791-809, September.
- de Regt, E.R., 2005. "Overtime and short-time with fluctuating absenteeism and demand," Research Memorandum 027, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- William Phan, 2019. "Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 205-242, March.
- Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2011. "Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 367, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Manjunath, Vikram & Westkamp, Alexander, 2021. "Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
- Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2018. "Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 187-202.
- Xiang Han & Onur Kesten & M. Utku Ünver, 2021. "Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1038, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Muto, Nozomu & Shirata, Yasuhiro, 2017. "Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 75-84.
- Schummer, James & Abizada, Azar, 2017. "Incentives in landing slot problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 29-55.
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JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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