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Manipulability of the Men-(Women) Optimal Matching Rule via Endowments

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  • Murat Sertel

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  • Murat Sertel, 2000. "Manipulability of the Men-(Women) Optimal Matching Rule via Endowments," Working Papers 0014, Department of Economics, Bilkent University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bil:wpaper:0014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andrew Postlewaite, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 255-262.
    2. Sertel, Murat R., 1992. "The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 45-55, September.
    3. Alkan, Ahmet & Gale, David, 1990. "The core of the matching game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 203-212, September.
    4. Sertel, Murat R., 1994. "Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 167-171, October.
    5. Schummer, James, 2000. "Manipulation through Bribes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 180-198, April.
    6. S. Nuray Akin & Murat R. Sertel, 2007. "The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Manipulated by Pre-Donations is Concessionary," Working Papers 0718, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    7. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1997. "Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 197-204, November.
    8. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
    9. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
    10. Alvin E. Roth, 1982. "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(4), pages 617-628, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Murat Atlamaz & Bettina Klaus, 2007. "Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 1-18, January.
    2. Klaus, Bettina & Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2006. "Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 106-110, October.
    3. S. Akin & Brennan Platt & Murat Sertel, 2011. "The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(2), pages 147-162, June.
    4. Doruk İriş & İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2011. "Manilulation via endowments in university-admission problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 2952-2958.
    5. S. Nuray Akin & Murat R. Sertel, 2007. "The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Manipulated by Pre-Donations is Concessionary," Working Papers 0718, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    6. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Application fee manipulations in matching markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 446-453.
    7. de Regt, E.R., 2005. "Overtime and short-time with fluctuating absenteeism and demand," Research Memorandum 027, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    8. Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2011. "Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 367, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    9. Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria & Klijn, Flip & Sanchez, Estela, 2004. "Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 295-312, May.
    10. Hüber, Frank, 2011. "Manipulationsanreize im Gale-Shapley-Algorithmus: Ein Literaturüberblick," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2011-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    11. Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek & Remzi Sanver, M., 2005. "Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 304-317, November.
    12. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2018. "Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 187-202.
    13. Muto, Nozomu & Shirata, Yasuhiro, 2017. "Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 75-84.
    14. Schummer, James & Abizada, Azar, 2017. "Incentives in landing slot problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 29-55.

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