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Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent

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  • Luis Corchón
  • Matteo Triossi

Abstract

In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infeasible allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renegotiation that is represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium in a class of reversion functions that punish agents for infeasibilities. This is used to study the implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and taxation.
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  • Luis Corchón & Matteo Triossi, 2011. "Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 179-198, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:36:y:2011:i:2:p:179-198
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0470-9
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