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Anreize in Turnieren mit heterogenen Teilnehmern — Eine empirische Untersuchung mit Daten aus der Fußball-Bundesliga

Author

Listed:
  • Bernd Frick

    (Universität Paderborn)

  • Oliver Gürtler

    (Universität Bonn)

  • Joachim Prinz

    (Universität Paderborn)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Obwohl in der theoretischen Literatur zu Turnieren vielfach argumentiert wird, dass diese nur dann ihre vollständige Anreizwirkung entfalten, wenn das Teilnehmerfeld annähernd homogen ist, gibt es dazu bislang kaum empirische Befunde. unter Verwendung von Informationen über insgesamt 756 Spiele der 1. Fußball-Bundesliga können wir zeigen, dass die Spielintensität — gemessen anhand der vom jeweiligen Schiedsrichter verhängten Disziplinarmaßnahmen — bei heterogenen Gegnern weniger stark ausgeprägt ist wie bei annähernd ausgeglichenen Mannschaften. Gegeben dieses Resultat sollten Personalverantwortliche bei der Zusammensetzung unternehmensinterner Turniere darauf achten, dass miteinander konkurrierende Mitarbeiter möglichst ähnliche Fähigkeiten aufweisen.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernd Frick & Oliver Gürtler & Joachim Prinz, 2008. "Anreize in Turnieren mit heterogenen Teilnehmern — Eine empirische Untersuchung mit Daten aus der Fußball-Bundesliga," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 60(4), pages 385-405, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:60:y:2008:i:4:d:10.1007_bf03372799
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372799
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    J33; L83; M52;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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