On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality kth rules
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00258-3
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More about this item
Keywords
Voting rules; Dictatorship; Manipulability;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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