Consensus rules for committee elections
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References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Jean-François Laslier & Karine Straeten, 2016.
"Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 559-587, October.
- Jean-François Laslier & Karine van Der Straeten, 2016. "Strategic Voting in Multi-Winner Elections with Approval Balloting: A Theory for Large Electorates," Working Papers halshs-01304688, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Karine van Der Straeten, 2016. "Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01518277, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Karine van Der Straeten, 2016. "Strategic Voting in Multi-Winner Elections with Approval Balloting: A Theory for Large Electorates," PSE Working Papers halshs-01304688, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Karine van Der Straeten, 2016. "Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates," Post-Print halshs-01518277, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2018.
"The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency,"
Working Papers
hal-01757761, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2018. "The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency," Working Papers halshs-01817943, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2018. "The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency," Working Papers 1812, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Edith Elkind & Piotr Faliszewski & Piotr Skowron & Arkadii Slinko, 2017. "Properties of multiwinner voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 599-632, March.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020.
"On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle,"
Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 699-725.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020. "On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle," Post-Print hal-02147735, HAL.
- Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2019. "On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle," Working Papers hal-02147735, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Karine van Der Straeten, 2015.
"Strategic Voting under Committee Approval: A Theory,"
PSE Working Papers
halshs-01168767, HAL.
- Jean-François Laslier & Karine van Der Straeten, 2015. "Strategic Voting under Committee Approval: A Theory," Working Papers halshs-01168767, HAL.
- repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01304688 is not listed on IDEAS
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