Power and efficiency in production pillage games
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-008-0056-5
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Acemoglu, Daron, 2003.
"Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
- Daron Acemoglu, 2002. "Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics," NBER Working Papers 9377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lucas, William F., 1992. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 17, pages 543-590, Elsevier.
- Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009.
"Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422.
- Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2006. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521855266.
- Jordan, J.S., 2006. "Pillage and property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 26-44, November.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Cai, Xinyue & Kimya, Mert, 2023. "Stability of alliance networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 401-409.
- Simon MacKenzie & Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2015.
"Pillage games with multiple stable sets,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 993-1013, November.
- Simon MacKenzie & Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2013. "Pillage Games with Multiple Stable Sets," Discussion Papers 13-07, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Rowat, Colin & Kerber, Manfred, 2014.
"Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 69-80.
- Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2012. "Sufficient Conditions for the Unique Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage Games," Discussion Papers 12-11, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Rakesh Chaturvedi, 2021. "Stability and efficiency in a model of production and pillage," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 313-333, December.
- Bertrand Crettez, 2020. "Pareto-minimality in the jungle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 495-508, March.
- Mert Kimya, 2024. "Power, Status and the Stability of Hierarchies," Working Papers 2024-04, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Iyigun, Murat, 2006. "Ottoman Conquests and European Ecclesiastical Pluralism," IZA Discussion Papers 1973, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2009.
"Spatial pillage game,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(11), pages 701-707, December.
- Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2007. "Spatial Pillage Game," MPRA Paper 4651, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jung, Hanjoon Michael / HM, 2007. "Spatial Pillage Game," MPRA Paper 9964, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Andrea Asoni, 2008. "Protection Of Property Rights And Growth As Political Equilibria," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 953-987, December.
- Verdier, Thierry & Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A., 2003.
"Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4059, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2003. "Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule," NBER Working Papers 10136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rowat, Colin & Kerber, Manfred, 2014.
"Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 69-80.
- Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2012. "Sufficient Conditions for the Unique Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage Games," Discussion Papers 12-11, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Verdier, Thierry & Bisin, Alberto, 2017.
"On the Joint Evolution of Culture and Institutions,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
12000, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alberto Bisin & Thierry Verdier, 2017. "On the Joint Evolution of Culture and Institutions," NBER Working Papers 23375, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alberto Bisin & Thierry Verdier, 2017. "On the Joint Evolution of Culture and Institutions," Working Papers 2017-039, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- David Hugh-Jones, 2008.
"Explaining Institutional Change: Why Elected Politicians Implement Direct Democracy,"
Jena Economics Research Papers
2008-085, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Hugh-Jones, David, 2010. "Explaining Institutional Change: Why Elected Politicians Implement Direct Democracy," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 25, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Sonin, Konstantin & Egorov, Georgy, 2005.
"The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5092, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- George Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," Economics Working Papers 0054, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Alice Nicole Sindzingre, 2015.
"‘Policy Externalisation’ Inherent Failure: International Financial Institutions’ Conditionality in Developing Countries,"
Post-Print
hal-01668363, HAL.
- Alice Sindzingre, 2016. "'Policy Externalisation' Inherent Failure: International Financial Institutions' Conditionality in Developing Countries," CEsA Working Papers 142, CEsA - Centre for African and Development Studies.
- Alice Nicole Sindzingre, 2017. "‘Policy externalisation’ inherent failure: international financial institutions’ conditionality in developing countries," Post-Print hal-01669873, HAL.
- Alice Nicole Sindzingre, 2015. "‘Policy Externalisation’ Inherent Failure: International Financial Institutions’ Conditionality in Developing Countries," Post-Print hal-01668367, HAL.
- Li, Yuan & Gilli, Mario, 2014. "Accountability in Autocracies: The Role of Revolution Threat," Stockholm School of Economics Asia Working Paper Series 2014-30, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute, revised 06 Mar 2014.
- Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015.
"Coalition Formation,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,,
Elsevier.
- Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2013. "Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2013-1, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- S. Guriev & G. Egorov & K. Sonin, 2007.
"Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse,"
Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 4.
- Georgy Egorov & Sergei Guriev & Konstantin Sonin, 2006. "Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse," Working Papers w0063, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), revised Jun 2006.
- Guriev, Sergei & Egorov, Georgy & Sonin, Konstantin, 2006. "Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives and the Resource Curse," CEPR Discussion Papers 5748, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Georgy Egorov & Sergei Guriev & Konstantin Sonin, 2006. "Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 06-10, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
- Jack Paine, 2024. "A comment on Powell and formal models of power sharing ," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(2), pages 212-233, April.
- Thomas Apolte, "undated".
"Why is there no Revolution in North-Korea? The Political Economy of Revolution Revisited,"
Working Papers
200102, Institute of Spatial and Housing Economics, Munster Universitary.
- Apolte, Thomas, 2010. "Why is there no revolution in North-Korea? The political economy of revolution revisited," CAWM Discussion Papers 29, University of Münster, Münster Center for Economic Policy (MEP).
- Joshua R. Hendrickson & Alexander William Salter, 2016. "A Theory of Why the Ruthless Revolt," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 295-316, November.
- Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat, 2009. "Stable Sets in Three Agent Pillage Games," Discussion Papers 09-07, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Flechtner, Svenja & Panther, Stephan, 2017. "Global and domestic inequalities and the political economy of the midde-income trap," Working Paper Serie des Instituts für Ökonomie Ök-29, Hochschule für Gesellschaftsgestaltung (HfGG), Institut für Ökonomie.
- Baland, Jean-Marie & Moene, Karl Ove & Robinson, James A., 2010.
"Governance and Development,"
Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4597-4656,
Elsevier.
- Jean-Marie Baland & Karl-Ove Moene & James A. Robinson, 2009. "Governance and Development," Working Papers 1007, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
- Gyöngyösi, Győző & Juhász, Réka & Mihályi, Dávid, 2008. "Daron Acemoglu a Rajk László Szakkollégium 2007. évi Neumann János-díjasa [Daron Acemoglu the winner of the 2007 János Neumann Prize of the László Rajk Specialist College]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 660-664.
- Bernardo Guimaraes & Kevin D. Sheedy, 2017.
"Guarding the Guardians,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(606), pages 2441-2477, November.
- Guimaraes, Bernardo & Sheedy, Kevin D., 2017. "Guarding the guardians," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65196, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
More about this item
Keywords
Conflict; Efficiency; Coalitional game; Pillage; Core; Stable set; Legitimacy; C71; D51; D61; D74;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:13:y:2009:i:3:p:171-193. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.