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Stability and efficiency in a model of production and pillage

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  • Rakesh Chaturvedi

    (Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology Delhi)

Abstract

A collective choice model of an environment where a society must allocate but cannot legally enforce property rights over an indivisible productive asset is studied. Coalitions are heterogeneous in their productive abilities and power. As such, a coalition may either produce wealth from the asset or pillage the asset from less powerful coalitions. For a wide class of production and pillage technologies, a subset of the set of efficient states is supported as a Consistent Set of Chwe (Journal of Economic Theory 63:299–325, 1994). In this Consistent Set, implicit enforcement of property rights through expectations is sufficient to make efficiency stable; explicit legal enforcement is not necessary.

Suggested Citation

  • Rakesh Chaturvedi, 2021. "Stability and efficiency in a model of production and pillage," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 313-333, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:inecre:v:56:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s41775-021-00125-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s41775-021-00125-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Property rights; Allocation by force; Pillage; Political economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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