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Coalition Formation and History Dependence

Author

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  • Bhaskar Dutta

    (University of Warwick and Ashoka University)

  • Hannu Vartiainen

    (University of Helsinki and Helsinki Graduate School of Economics)

Abstract

Farsighted formulations of coalitional formation, for instance by Harsanyi (1974) and Ray and Vohra(2015), have typically been based on the von NeumannMorgenstern (1944) stable set. These farsighted stable sets use a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional 'moves' in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. Dutta and Vohra(2016) point out that these solution concepts do not require coalitions to make optimal moves. Hence, these solution concepts can yield unreasonable predictions. Dutta and Vohra (2016) restricted coalitions to hold common, history independent expectations that incorporate optimality regarding the continuation path. This paper extends the Dutta-Vohra analysis by allowing for history dependent expectations. The paper provides characterization results for two solution concepts corresponding to two versions of optimality. It demonstrates the power of history dependence by establishing nonemptyness results for all ï¬ nite games as well as transferable utility partition function games. The paper also provides partial comparisons of the solution concepts to other solutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhaskar Dutta & Hannu Vartiainen, 2018. "Coalition Formation and History Dependence," Working Papers 02, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ash:wpaper:02
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hirata, Daisuke & Kasuya, Yusuke & Tomoeda, Kentaro, 2021. "Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 474-498.
    2. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2020. "Matching with myopic and farsighted players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    3. Bloch, Francis & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2020. "Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 32-54.
    4. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, V., 2020. "Do Stable Outcomes Survive in Marriage Problems with Myopic and Farsighted Players?," Research Memorandum 031, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    5. Kenzo Imamura & Hideo Konishi, 2023. "Assortative Matching with Externalities and Farsighted Agents," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 497-509, June.
    6. Kimya, Mert, 2020. "Farsighted Objections and Maximality in One-to-one Matching Problems," Working Papers 202014, University of Sydney, School of Economics, revised Jul 2021.
    7. Mert Kimya, 2024. "Power, Status and the Stability of Hierarchies," Working Papers 2024-04, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    8. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2023. "Social Rationalizability with Mediation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 440-461, June.
    9. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele, 2019. "Mechanism design with farsighted agents," MPRA Paper 94436, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Bloch, Francis & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2021. "Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 663-683.
    11. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2019. "Implementation with foresighted agents," MPRA Paper 102496, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Herings, P.J.J. & Khan, Abhimanyu, 2022. "Network Stability under Limited Foresight," Discussion Paper 2022-013, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    13. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2021. "Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 202-212.
    14. Mert Kimya, 2023. "Coalition Formation Under Dominance Invariance," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 480-496, June.
    15. Mert Kimya, 2024. "Axiomatic Approach to Farsighted Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2024-03, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    16. Kimya, Mert, 2020. "Farsighted Objections and Maximality in One-to-one Matching Problems," Working Papers 2020-14, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    17. Kimya, Mert, 2021. "Coalition Formation Under Dominance Invariance," Working Papers 2021-06, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    18. Cai, Xinyue & Kimya, Mert, 2023. "Stability of alliance networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 401-409.
    19. Kimya, Mert, 2022. "Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    20. Kimya, Mert, 2021. "Coalition Formation Under Dominance Invariance," Working Papers 202106, University of Sydney, School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coalition;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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